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Security engineering requires a combination of features and assurance to provide 
confidence that security policy is correctly enforced.  Rigorous engineering principles are 
applicable across a broad range of systems.  The purpose of this study is to analyze and 
compare three operating systems, including two general-purpose operating systems 
(Linux and OpenBSD) and a commercially available, embedded operating system 
(Talisker).  The basis for the comparison considers secure software design principles, 
such as information hiding, hierarchical structuring, and modularity, as well as software 
complexity metrics, such as the McCabe Cyclomatic Complexity and the number-of-
lines-of-code.  In this analysis, we use a reverse engineering tool to show how the three 
operating systems compare to each other with respect to the qualities of a secure 
operating system design.  The operating systems, their kernels, and their scheduling 
subsystems are analyzed and compared.  From the results, it is shown that the OpenBSD 
operating system, kernel, and scheduler are the best when considering hierarchical 
structuring, modularity, and information hiding.  The Linux kernel and scheduler and the 
Talisker operating system are least complex when considering the McCabe complexity 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
Security engineering requires a combination of features and assurance to provide 
confidence that security policy is correctly enforced.  Rigorous engineering principles are 
applicable across a broad range of systems.   
The purpose of this study is to analyze and compare three operating systems, 
including two general-purpose operating systems (Linux and OpenBSD) and a 
commercially available, embedded operating system (Talisker).  The basis for the 
comparison considers secure software design principles, such as information hiding, 
hierarchical structuring, and modularity, as well as software complexity metrics, such as 
the McCabe Cyclomatic Complexity and the number-of-lines-of-code.  In this analysis, 
we use a reverse engineering tool to show how the three operating systems compare to 
each other with respect to the qualities of a secure operating system design.     
B. MOTIVATION 
The questions that continuously challenge and trouble the typical desktop owners, 
using their personal computers for records and data storage, as well as government 
agencies with a vested interest in information security, is what flaws that have yet to be 
discovered are resident in their system, and how will those flaws affect the end user?  Is it 
possible that undocumented functionality, whether harmless or malicious, exists inside 
the source code?  It has been noted that contemporary systems, in general, provide little 
protection against accidental violation of operating system safeguards, let alone any 
protection against deliberate attempts to gain control of the operating system.  This is 
unacceptable. There needs to be some type of defined controls or limitations enforced by 
the operating system to protect each user from all other users.  Additionally, as the 
Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria [DOD85] states in its accountability 
control objective, systems used to process or handle classified or other sensitive 
information must assure individual accountability whenever either a mandatory or 
discretionary security policy is invoked.   
The steps to building a secure system involve creating a model or ideal 
description of a secure system from its uses, environment, and threats; developing the 
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security portion of the kernel to handle access control and authorization mechanisms; and 
then integrating the kernel with the rest of the system.  It is the omission of this design for 
secure operation and the lack of strict control of programs in execution that characterizes 
most contemporary systems, and which in combination with the size and complexity of 
the systems makes it impossible to conduct meaningful testing or certification to 
determine that the systems are secure.  Any type of methodical design is apparently 
undesirable in the commercial arena because products so developed take to much time to 
get to market.  In addition, these methods require a higher intellectual caliber than that 
required by the customary commercial approaches. 
Nevertheless, some basic guidelines in secure operating system design need to be 
established and shared with the commercial and open operating system worlds.  Thus, the 
use of good hierarchical structuring, accurate problem decomposition and modular 
programming, and the proper design of interfaces should be applied to all system designs.    
C. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
By providing a comparative analysis between several systems, political and 
military decision makers will be able to see what characteristics of a secure operating 
system are desired, and how the systems available today fare against these qualities as 
well as each other.  With the threats in the computer security problem evolving in an ever 
growing domain of users world-wide, the government and the military need to consider 
the benefits of building a secure operating system and demand that commercial-off-the-
shelf vendors meet a certain standard of assurance using independent code audits.  This 
research will provide a foundation for understanding the complexity that is found in 
commercial operating systems as well as their lack of secure software design principles.  
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The principal, analytical approach used in this thesis is that of reverse 
engineering.  Reverse engineering starts with an existing system, analyzing it to identify 
its components, their behavior, and the interrelationships among components.  A 
principal benefit of reverse engineering is the discovery of useful information and 
structures, such as reusable data models, control structures, interface descriptors, design, 
behavior properties, function and performance requirements, data structures, algorithms, 
and architecture.  In this research, we plan to utilize the Imagix 4D reverse-engineering 
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and documentation tool to provide a fair comparative analysis of the Linux, OpenBSD, 
and Talisker operating systems.   
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis consists of seven chapters.  Chapter II provides an overview of secure 
operating system characteristics.  Chapter III discusses the methodology for building 
secure operating systems using trusted system design elements and software design 
principles.  A case study of the Multics Project is then presented to review the lessons 
learned from retrofitting security in an existing system.  Chapter IV describes the 
management of complexity in operating system development and introduces the McCabe 
Cyclomatic Complexity metric.  Chapter V reviews the Imagix 4D reverse-engineering 
and documentation tool that was used in the comparative analysis.  Chapter VI examines 
the Linux, OpenBSD, and Talisker operating systems with the Imagix 4D tool, shows the 
data that was gathered with illustrations, and provides the results of the comparative 
analysis.  Chapter VII concludes the thesis with a review of the findings and suggestions 



























































II. OVERVIEW OF SECURE OPERATING SYSTEMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When computers were first used for automated data processing, few considered 
the importance of information security outside the realm of physical security.  If the 
system designer never addressed parameter checking to protect the user from crashing his 
own system, then why would he consider classes of attacks where the user may be 
playing a malicious role?  Security specialists, such as James Anderson [AND72], have 
found it useful to place potential security violations into three different categories: 
unauthorized information release, unauthorized information modification, and 
unauthorized denial of service.  Today, security professionals refer to these three 
categories simply as confidentiality, integrity, and availability respectively.   
To develop a secure operating system that addresses the protection of information 
from potential security breaches, the computer security problem must be well understood.  
In this chapter, an assessment of the threats to security will be given, including a 
classification of attackers followed by a set of techniques whereby computer misuse 
results in the unauthorized disclosure or modification of information.  After providing the 
motivation for protection in operating systems, the reference monitor concept and the 
notion of a trusted computing base will be introduced.  These concepts coupled together 
will provide a set of principles that can be applied both to the selection and design of 
security features, the developmental assurance required to implement a secure system, 
and how the mechanization of the security policies can be implemented as a subset of the 
operating system.      
B. ASSESSMENT OF THREATS TO SECURITY 
Undertaken by the Air Force, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), 
and other defense agencies, a study was conducted to provide a solution for the technical 
problems associated with controlling the flow of information in resource and information 
sharing computer systems [AND72].  The resulting technical report, commonly called the 
“Anderson Report,” described an architectural framework for handling mediation of 
access in the face of potentially hostile users.  It additionally noted that contemporary 
systems, in general, provided little protection against accidental violation of the operating 
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system, let alone any protection against deliberate attempts to gain control of the 
operating system.  This was unacceptable. There needed to be some type of defined 
controls or limitations enforced by the operating system to protect each user from all 
other users.  Due to the problems in hardware and operating system design at the time, 
the ad hoc programs developed to mediate between applications and operating systems 
were significant in size and were only capable of providing a degree of security in a non-
malicious environment, but they did not provide adequate protection to defend against a 
hostile programmer.     
One attempt to address security flaws in operating system and application design 
is appropriately named the “penetrate and patch” approach.  Using this methodology, a 
“tiger team” of testers, code auditors, and hostile programmers are tasked to test the 
protection offered by an operating system, exploiting implementation errors and design 
oversights.  Another team of designers then patches these flaws and vulnerabilities, after 
which the tiger team will again attempt to penetrate the operating system.  Anderson 
[AND72] commented in his report that any attempts to “patch” an off-the-shelf system 
for security tended to obscure penetration routes, but had little impact on the underlying 
security problems.  His conclusion was that if a system were designed to include many 
central privileged functions, it would inevitably become quite large and capable of 
concealing numerous flaws.  These are the system flaws in particular that the malicious 
user tries to find and exploit in the pursuit of gaining supervisory control, commonly 
called “administrator level privileges” of the system.   
Once supervisory control is obtained, the malicious user now “owns the box” and 
can reference any data or programs in the system.  As illustrated by Brinkley and Schell 
[BRI93], the threat of malicious users does not end with just the exploitation of errors in 
the operating system code.  Subversion, which can occur at any time in the life cycle of a 
system, can result in the exploitation of clandestine mechanisms called artifices that are 
constructed and inserted into a system to circumvent normal control or protection 
features.  The most common types of artifices are known as trap doors, which permits the 
attacker to bypass internal controls at a later time.  To support the argument that the DoD 
needs to employ secure operating systems for sufficient protection against these 
subversive threats, some recent examples of possible threats will be reviewed.       
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The questions that continuously challenge and trouble the typical desktop owners, 
using their personal computers for records and data storage, as well as several 
government agencies with a vested interest in information security, is what flaws that 
have yet to be discovered are resident in their system, and how will those flaws affect the 
end user?  Is it possible that undocumented functionality, whether harmless or malicious, 
exists inside the source code?  Involving the popular software-distributor Microsoft, 
recent examples of possible subversive threats have been documented in the media.  
From January 30-31, 2001, someone posing as a Microsoft employee tricked VeriSign, 
which hands out digital certificates, into issuing two certificates in Microsoft’s name 
[LEM01].  Empowered with these Verisign-issued certificates, a malicious user could 
post a virus on the Internet that would appear to be from Microsoft, but might actually 
wipe an unsuspecting user’s hard drive, for example. On Saturday, October 14, 2001, 
hackers gained access to Microsoft’s internal network system and roamed source code 
files and other high-level secrets for approximately 12 days to five weeks [BBC01].  If 
the hackers had managed to access the source code of a Microsoft program already on the 
market, they would have been able to distribute versions of the product that looked 
legitimate but contained security holes or viruses.  After the unfortunate events of 
September 11, 2001, when commercial airliners piloted by hijacking terrorists struck the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a suspected member of the Al Qaeda terrorist 
network claimed that Islamic militants infiltrated Microsoft and sabotaged the company’s 
Windows XP operating system [MCW01].  These and other examples have motivated 
computer scientists, information technology managers, and the general public to rethink 
what should be more important in an operating system design – security or functionality.   
Profiles of the different adversaries will be reviewed to build an understanding of 
the threat environment in which a computer system resides.  Ross Anderson [AND96] 
categorized hostile attackers in three brief bullets: 
• Class I (Clever Outsiders): These individuals are often very intelligent but 
may have little knowledge of the system internals.  They only have access to 
moderately sophisticated equipment and often take advantage of known flaws.    
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• Class II (Knowledgeable Insiders): These may be employees that have 
substantial specialized technical education and experience, have varying 
degrees of understanding certain parts of the system, but potentially have 
unlimited access.  They often have sophisticated tools and instruments for 
analysis. 
• Class III (Funded Organizations): These groups are able to assemble teams of 
specialists with related and complementary skills backed by great funding and 
resources.  They are capable of in-depth analysis, designing sophisticated 
attacks, and using advanced analysis tools. 
This taxonomy gives a backdrop to the flavor of malevolent individuals and 
organizations that exist in the world today.  These adversaries may utilize various misuse 
techniques as presented by Brinkley and Schell [BRI93], including (1) human error, (2) 
user abuse of authority, (3) direct probing, (4) probing with malicious software, (5) direct 
penetration, and (6) subversion of security mechanism.  Common to these six techniques 
are two elements.  First, a flaw or vulnerability in a computer system exists in either the 
design or implementation.  And second, the possible threat of attack exists by an 
authorized or unauthorized user (or agent) of the system attempting to exploit the flaw.  
The product of these two factors is equivalent to the amount of risk a user needs to 
consider when operating a system.  
We will examine these misuse techniques and their related countermeasures.  The 
first of these is human error, which happens to be probabilistic in nature.  This technique 
may involve a combination of human, hardware, and timing factors that could allow 
unauthorized access to information.  Better human-computer interactive design should 
provide for a simple user interface to reduce the probability of human error.   
User abuse of authority, also known as the insider threat, is the second misuse 
technique.  An example of this is a bank teller performing an illegal transaction.  This 
authorized individual abuses the trust and authority granted in order to perform an 
irresponsible act for personal gain.  To prevent this behavior, the system should confine 
the authorized users to their own domains of authority using techniques such as 
identification and authentication, and should audit their access requests. 
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Guessing passwords or searching for readable files are examples of direct 
probing, the next class of techniques to protect against.  In this category, individuals try 
to use computer systems in ways not intended by the system designers or owners.  Even 
though it is unethical to probe through another machine’s file directory, nothing prevents 
or disallows a user from doing so.  Correct system configuration and fail-safe defaults, 
which bases access decisions on permission rather than exclusion, are some examples of 
preventive measures to help defend against this class of misuse.  
Probing with malicious software is similar to direct probing in that it is allowed 
but unethical; however, in this technique attackers employ specially developed software 
for the express purpose of carrying out the probing for them.  A Trojan Horse, which 
contains overt functionality attractive to an unsuspecting user while performing covert 
functionality that has illegitimate side effects unknown to the user, is an example of such 
malicious software.  There are several types of Trojan Horses in existence, including (1) 
viruses, which are pieces of self-replicating code that attach themselves to other programs 
in order to be executed, (2) time bombs, which are Trojan Horses set to trigger at a 
particular time, (3) logic bombs, which are Trojan Horses set to trigger upon the 
occurrence of a particular logical event, and (4) worms, which, like viruses self-replicate, 
but spread from system to system on their own exploiting system vulnerabilities.  To 
prevent these occurrences, enforcement of non-discretionary policies and strong life cycle 
assurance for systems is required.  
In the case of bypassing intended security controls, direct penetration is one of 
the more difficult techniques to protect against.  Penetration is defined as the exploitation 
of a flaw using an attack to achieve an objective (compromise confidentiality, integrity, 
or denial of service).  In many cases, one simply needs to find a single flaw in the 
implementation of the operating system or hardware and write a program to take control 
of the entire computer system.  For protection, formal methods and good software 
engineering need to be applied to rid the system of flaws.  This is where time and cost 
begin to grow significantly, adding difficulty to the design and construction of a secure 
operating system that is safe from direct penetration.  Providing assurance that the 
operating system is implemented correctly and operates in accordance with policy is 
exercised throughout the management of the system lifecycle.     
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Subversion of security mechanism, the last of the six techniques, involves the 
covert and methodical undermining of internal system controls to allow unauthorized and 
undetected access to information within the computer system.  An example of this is the 
insertion of an undocumented feature, like an Easter egg (www.eeggs.com), on a machine 
during the manufacturing process.  The major concern of this technique is that subversion 
is possible in any activity of the system life cycle, including design, implementation, 
distribution, installation, and use.  For protection, controls must be built to specifications 
in a non-malicious environment and be simple and small enough to verify correct 
behavior when subjected to testing and evaluation.  
From the TCSEC definition [DOD85], protection must be defined from the start 
in terms of the perceived threats, risks, and goals of an organization.  With a review of 
the threats to security completed, it is necessary to elaborate on protection to give a flavor 
of what is possible in the design of a secure operating system. 
C. PROTECTION IN OPERATING SYSTEMS 
In 1971, Butler Lampson [LAM71] defined “protection” as a general term for all 
of the mechanisms that control the access of a program to system resources.  The original 
motivation for putting such mechanisms into computer systems was to keep one user’s 
malice or error from harming others by destroying or modifying data, reading or copying 
data without permission, or degrading the service of another user.    
Saltzer and Schroeder [SAL75] suggested a division of protection schemes 
according to functional properties into five categories: unprotected, all-or-nothing, 
controlled sharing, user-programmed controlled sharing, and putting attributes on 
information.  The unprotected systems have no mechanisms for preventing a determined 
user from having access to every piece of data stored inside the machine.  All-or-nothing 
systems provide for the isolation of users.  Total sharing of some information, which is 
available to all, sometimes moderates this type of system.  Controlled sharing systems, 
which are significantly more complex, control explicitly who may access each data item 
resident in the system.  An Access Control List (ACL) is an example of this type of 
system.  User-programmed control sharing systems are used in the case that access may 
be restricted to a file in such a way not provided by the controlled sharing operations.  
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Gates, time of day, and “two person control” are all examples of this type.  The systems 
that put attributes on information are able to maintain some control over the use of label-
based information.  In all these protection schemes, maintaining confidentiality of 
information with access control mechanisms is the objective.    
The access control model for confidentiality was first introduced by Lampson 
[LAM71] and was refined by Graham and Denning [GRA72].  Harrison, Ruzzo, and 
Ullman [HAR76] later used Lampson’s concept of an access control model to analyze the 
complexity of determining the effects of a particular access control policy.  Their 
conclusions showed that the problem of building a general-purpose algorithm to 
determine whether an arbitrary program, comprised of simple primitives for updating an 
access matrix, leaks an access right is undecidable.  Therefore, the fundamental result of 
the HRU Model is that one cannot construct an algorithm to examine all arbitrary systems 
for leakage of access rights.    
Bell and LaPadula’s [BEL73] formal policy model included mandatory access 
control.  The model introduced the additions of labels for subjects and objects and the 
simple security policy and the *-property.  These two properties for confidentiality 
provided two rules for information flow between subjects and objects employing labels: 
(1) no read up (simple security policy) and (2) no write down (*-property or confinement 
property).  The first rule mimics the paper world where users can only view data they are 
authorized to see, and the second rule prevents Trojan Horse programs from copying 
sensitive data to files that are accessible by unauthorized users.  
To assist with the design of a system, a model can provide a coherent and 
consistent expression of the policy.  But before the implementation of an operating 
system can be described, a review of an abstract model, the reference monitor concept, is 
required to understand the necessary and sufficient criteria for a system to provide 
confidence of policy enforcement in the face of malicious threat.   
D. THE REFERENCE MONITOR CONCEPT 
The Reference Monitor Concept, which emerged as part of the Anderson Report 
in 1972, provides a description of an ideal mechanism representing the necessary and 
sufficient functions to enforce a policy to control access by subjects to objects.  A subject 
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is defined as an active entity that causes information to flow among objects or changes 
system state.  In comparison, an object is a passive entity that contains or receives 
information.  Access to an object implies access to the information it contains.  Hence, 
the reference monitor is an abstraction that controls all access or the collection of access 
controls applied to objects like devices, files, memory, directories, and interprocess 
communications [PFL97].  The process is simply a program in execution characterized 
by a single current execution point, represented by the machine state, and an address 
space.  A “domain” is the set of objects that a subject has the ability to access [DOD85]. 
To protect the memory of each domain, an implementation technique called 
protection domains partitions the memory into more privileged and less privileged 
regions.  Programs in lesser-privileged domains cannot arbitrarily read and write files or 
execute programs in more privileged domains.  Figure 1, which illustrates two separate 
protection domains, demonstrates this concept.  When the process calls an operating 
system function, it changes from the user subject to the operating system subject of the 
process.  Since the operating system is a more privileged domain, the user programs 















Figure 1.   User and Operating System Protection Domains.  
Within this system model, everything belongs to some process and cannot be accessed by 
any other process other than its owner.  The user program can, however, call into the 
higher domain in a controlled way, for example, using a gate or trap mechanism that 
allows lesser-privileged subjects to invoke services of greater privileged subjects as 
shown in Figure 2.  Saltzer and Schroeder [SAL75] proposed this concept of protection in 
computer systems with their three requirements for kernel isolation, including (1) a 
privileged state bit, (2) the partition of protected memory, and (3) a mechanism that 
authorizes transfer of control from an unprotected level to one that is protected.  In an 
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Intel X86 processor, the features that are available to support these respective 
requirements include a protection bit, descriptor table segmentation, and four rings of 

















Figure 2.   Gate Calls in Protection Domains.  
Ring brackets are a software implementation of protection domains, where each 
object has a “bracket” of values that specifies what domains can access the object.  An 
example ring brackets policy, utilizing the Intel privilege levels (PL0-PL3) built into the 
hardware, could be [R1, R2, R3], where each Rn is assigned a value from {PL0…PL3}.  In 
this instance, PL0-R1 is the write bracket (viz, subjects PL0 through the value in R1 may 
write to the associated object), PL0-R2 is the read bracket, and PL0-R3 is the execute 
bracket.  An example of such an implementation can be found in GEMSOS [FER95].  
The abstract reference monitor concept can mediate the access requests between subjects 
and objects according to such a ring construct.      
The implementation of the reference monitor has been called the reference 
validation mechanism, a combination of hardware and software [AND72].  The current 
access authorizations, graphically modeled as the current access matrix, represent who 
has access to what and with what modes and rights.  This can be abstractly described 
using a set of tuples indicating that a subject has current access to an object with a 
particular mode, <subject, object, access mode>.  To enforce policy, the mechanism 
requires that all subjects and objects have policy-relevant attributes associated with them 
and maintained in the authorization database, graphically modeled as the authorization 
matrix.  Figure 3 depicts an abstract model of the reference monitor.     
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Figure 3.   The Reference Monitor Concept. 
From this abstract model, one can observe that the reference monitor enforces the 
authorized access relationships between the subjects and objects of a system.  User 
identification, clearance levels, and current session levels could all be attached to a 
certain subject acting on a users behalf.  An object, in comparison, could have access 
control lists, ring brackets, and sensitivity labels that contain information about who can 
access the object and what levels of clearance are required.  Variations of an access 
control policy that is either identity-based or label-based can define the specific access 
control requirements.  
  To establish that the model’s behavior complies with the requirements of an 
access control policy, a “basic security theorem” may be included in the model.  For 
example, if it is shown that the current access authorizations (CAA) is a subset of the 
authorization database (AD) in the initial state and in every operation, and the AD is 
consistent with the access control policy, then we can conclude that the module enforces 
the policy.  The practical utility of this model is that the CAA corresponds well with the 
descriptor-based hardware mechanisms, and it permits the basic security theorem to be 
expressed as an invariant.  Access relationships of getting access and releasing access 
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between subjects and objects, as well as the reference relationships like reading and 
writing, define the abstract reference monitor functions.            
These abstract access and reference functions are implemented by the reference 
validation mechanism, which constitutes the necessary and sufficient functions for 
enforcing a policy of controlled access to objects by subjects.  By definition, it is required 
to be tamperproof, always invoked, and small enough to be subject to analysis and tests 
to assure that it is correct [AND72].  To be tamperproof, the mechanism needs to be self-
protecting and must be constructed so that the mechanisms it relies on are at least as 
assured as it is.  (This will be discussed later when the notion of hierarchical layering of 
system dependencies will be introduced.)  To be always invoked, mediation of access to 
all resources needs to always be “on” and cannot be circumvented.  And as defined 
earlier by necessary and sufficient, it needs to be small enough to ensure that accesses to 
objects are being mediated (viz, it is sufficient to the task), and nothing extra considered 
irrelevant to the requirement for access validation is included (viz, only the necessary 
functions are included).     
Relative to the characteristics discussed above, the crucial role of the reference 
monitor in enforcing security means that it must function correctly.  But because the 
likelihood of correct behavior decreases as the complexity and size of a program increase, 
the best assurance of correct policy enforcement is a small, simple, understandable 
implementation [MYE80].  Therefore, to achieve assurance that the reference validation 
mechanism is correctly implemented, minimization and rigorous software engineering is 
required.  This topic will be discussed later in the following chapter. 
It is important to remember that the mechanism described above is not a model of 
secure computing.  Rather it is a device to provide containment of programs in execution 
[AND72].  Therefore, since the reference monitor only represents the access control 
mechanism, elements of the system for supporting the security policy also need to be 
included in the system implementation, including (1) identification and authentication, 
(2) security administrator interfaces, and (3) audit retrieval and analysis functions.  With 
all of these supporting functions along with the reference validation mechanism, one 
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could integrate all of the system security controls into a portion of the operating system 
code.  This leads us to the notion of a trusted computing base. 
E. THE TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), defines the trusted 
computing base (TCB) as the set of all protection mechanisms in a computing system, 
including the hardware, firmware, and software, which together enforce a unified security 
policy over a product or system [NIS91].  It contains all the elements of a system for 
supporting the security policy and for the support of the isolation of objects upon which 












Figure 4.   Sample Monolithic TCB Architectures. 
Figure 4 depicts sample monolithic TCB architectures.  The hash marks drawn 
around portions of the system delineate the security perimeter of the trusted computing 
base.  This perimeter includes all of the elements of the system for supporting the security 
policy and for the support of the isolation of objects upon which protection is based.  For 
instance, the TCB in general-purpose system A of Figure 4 includes the operating system, 
the security support functions (SSF), such as identification, authentication, and auditing, 
the reference validation mechanism, and the hardware, while the systems in parts B and C 
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exclude the general-purpose operating system functions from the TCB perimeter.  In 
comparison, the embedded system in part D may include part of the application layer, 
thereby enclosing the entire system within the TCB perimeter.  In this embedded system 
example, the TCB is also called the kernel like the system observed in part B.  The kernel 
can also be a subset of the TCB, as demonstrated in system C.  However, unlike any of 
the architectures shown, the TCB term can include systems that do not contain a 
reference validation mechanism or a security kernel.  A TCB always refers to an 
implemented system for a computer.      
As defined in the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria [DOD85], there 
are a certain number of architectural requirements that need to be met by the TCB in 
order for it to have a high level of assurance (i.e., level B3).  The TCSEC requires that the 
TCB shall: 
• Maintain a domain for its own execution that protects it from external 
interference or tampering. 
• Maintain process isolation through the provision of distinct address spaces 
under its control. 
• Be internally structured into well-defined independent modules. 
• Structure modules such that the principle of least privilege is enforced. 
• Identify the correct functionality of the TCB interface and elements. 
• Incorporate significant use of layering, abstraction, and data hiding. 
• Employ proper system engineering to minimize complexity and exclude 
modules that are not protection critical.  
F. CONCLUSION 
From our discussion, we have noted that the environment to be protected must be 
well understood.  After an assessment of the threats to security is reviewed, a system 
must then be designed to provide the desired protection.  A protection scheme may 
include a security kernel that is responsible for enforcing the security policy.  This 
security kernel is an implementation of an abstract concept called the reference monitor 
that controls the accesses to objects.  To encompass all of the parts of a trusted operating 
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system on which we depend for the correct enforcement of a security policy, the notion of 
a trusted computing base and its security perimeter were introduced.  In the next chapter, 
the security policy and model, design principles for secure operating systems, the security 
kernel concept, and criteria for evaluation and assurance will be reviewed to demonstrate 
a proper approach in building a secure operating system.  A case study from the Multics 















III. BUILDING A SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Ken Thompson [THO84] has commented that, by default, an application should 
not be trusted if the end user did not write the code himself.  He further stated that no 
matter how much a posteriori source-level verification or scrutiny is completed, no 
amount will protect the user from untrusted code.  He illustrated this point by describing 
an instance of an artifice first suggested by Karger and Schell [KAR74].  Thompson 
claimed to have introduced an artifice into the C compiler as subverted code.  When this 
code in the compiler determined that it was compiling the “login” code for the Unix 
operating system, it would generate code to accept not only the valid password but also a 
fixed password he had previously selected and built into the artifice or trapdoor.  
Thompson then planted code in the compiler, which in turn added the code for the two 
artifices into the object code each time it recompiled subsequent versions of the compiler, 
removing the subverted code from the compiler source code altogether.  With this 
program, Thompson gave a classic example of how to construct clandestine mechanisms 
that can be introduced into the software during the construction phase of the system life 
cycle.  Previous efforts have demonstrated that it is possible to design, construct, and 
maintain a secure operating system throughout its life cycle to keep it free of such 
subversive threats.  The XTS 200 and XTS 300 [FER92] and GEMSOS [FER95] are 
examples of these efforts.    
In the Anderson Report [AND72], the steps to build a secure system involved 
creating a model or ideal description of a secure system followed by the development of 
the security portion of the system or the security kernel, which would later be integrated 
with the rest of the system.  This task, however, is not as easy as it may sound.  The 
design of a trusted system is a difficult process, involving the selection of the appropriate 
and consistent set of features together with an appropriate degree of assurance that the 




B. THE SECURITY POLICY AND MODEL 
1. The Policy 
The Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria defined the security policy 
control objective as follows: “A statement of intent with regard to control over access to 
and dissemination of information, to be known as the security policy must be precisely 
defined and implemented for each system that is used to process sensitive information.  
The security policy must accurately reflect the laws, regulations, and general policies 
from which it is derived” [DOD85].  Hence, the security policy is an informal set of well 
defined, consistent, and implementable rules oriented towards an organization and their 
policies.   
Categories and subcategories of different policies to control the access and 
dissemination of information are discussed at length in computer security texts.  The 
major categories include the mandatory access control policy (MAC), the discretionary 
access control policy (DAC), and supporting policies.  The subdivisions of categories are 
related to the further control of information with respect to secrecy and integrity. 
2. The Model 
Once the policy has been established, the organization designing the system needs 
a formal statement, oriented towards implementation, of what is meant by a secure 
system.  This policy model provides for a number of advantages for the design, including 
(1) completeness by including all relevant assertions, (2) clearness by making the 
statement understandable and brief, and (3) correctness by ensuring the statement is 
accurate.  The model also supports assurance by providing constraints on system 
behavior, consistency with no contradictions, and a basis for validation.   
After constructing the model, the designer must study the different ways that the 
security can be enforced in the system.  This will assist the designer in building 
confidence that the proposed system will meet its requirements prior to actually creating 
the trusted operating system.  This high level of confidence is the objective when 




C. TRUSTED SYSTEM DESIGN ELEMENTS 
Prior to discussing the design of a trusted operating system, it would be beneficial 
to review the eight design principles that have been provided from the experiences of 
others who invested considerable time and energy in system research.  These eight were 
first discussed by Saltzer and Schroeder [SAL75] and are as follows: economy of 
mechanism, fail-safe defaults, complete mediation, open design, separation of privilege, 
least privilege, least common mechanism, and psychological acceptability.  The economy 
of mechanism and least common mechanism are more central to the theme of this thesis, 
but a brief discussion of all of these will be given here to preserve continuity and provide 
context. 
In setting the fail-safe defaults, the designer, acting conservatively in the interest 
of the user, needs to identify what items should be accessible rather than those that should 
not.  Therefore, the default condition should be denial of access. 
To obtain complete mediation, every access attempt must be checked.  This means 
that the mechanism for checking these access attempts needs to be positioned correctly so 
it can mediate direct access attempts.  It must be designed so that attempts to circumvent 
the system will fail. 
An open design simply means that the design should not be secret.  With the 
exception of a few key items like password tables, the source code should be open to 
extensive public scrutiny to help provide criticism, new ideas, and independent 
confirmation of the security design.  In the context of commercial systems, where 
protection of intellectual property is of great importance to the vendor, an independent 
evaluation with a memorandum of understanding could be established between the 
company and the reviewer.    
Separation of privilege is common in the commercial business world and makes 
good sense here in the design of secure systems.  Ideally, access to objects should depend 
on more than just an <identification, password> pair; for some systems, this could mean 
two person access control where both users need to enter keys, or for others, the user is 
required to have an <identification, password> pair accompanied by a token with a 
cryptographic key.  In this way, if one protection system is defeated (i.e., the password 
22 
has been cracked or discovered using social engineering), the attacker will not have 
complete access.  The “Defense in Depth” concept, which combines the capabilities of 
people, operations, and security technologies like firewalls, intrusion detection systems, 
and public key cryptography to establish multiple layers of protection, could be viewed as 
an instantiation of this separation of privilege principle.   
Least privilege means that that every program and every user of the system should 
operate using the fewest privileges possible.  This helps minimize the extent of the 
damage caused by a malicious or inadvertent attack. 
The notion of psychological acceptability relates to the ease of use issues that all 
software engineers contend with in human computer interface design.  If the mechanism 
for security is not easy to use (i.e., users routinely and automatically apply the protection 
mechanisms), then it is more likely that the user would apply them incorrectly or not at 
all. 
Use of least common mechanism will be discussed later in the Multics case study 
to demonstrate the importance of minimizing the amount of mechanism common to more 
than one user and depended on by all users, especially in the design of the security kernel.  
Since shared mechanisms provide for potential channels of information flow, systems 
should employ physical or logical separations to reduce the risk of sharing. 
Economy of mechanism, which will be discussed later in Chapter 4, delineates that 
the design of a protection system should be simple, small as possible, and 
straightforward.  This will enable the protection system to be more carefully analyzed, 
exhaustively tested, verified, and relied upon with a degree of confidence or assurance -- 
one of the characteristics of the reference monitor concept that we are striving to achieve.  
Keeping these principles in mind can guide the design and contribute to an 
implementation that has no security flaws [SAL75].  Together with the proper software 
design principles that will be discussed next, the security engineer will have the 




D. SECURE SOFTWARE DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
The system lifecycle that is taken into consideration by the security engineer 
includes the following steps: requirements engineering or specification, design, 
implementation, testing, documentation, configuration management, system distribution, 
and system maintenance [DOD85].  After completing the requirements specification, the 
software design needs to follow a systematic approach to identify the major components 
of the system, specifying what each component does and establishing the interfaces 
between these components.  Modularity is one principle of software engineering that 
makes this approach possible.    
1. Modular Programming 
When commenting on proper system design, Gauthier and Pont [GAU70] have 
stated that a well-defined segmentation of the project effort ensures system modularity.  
This means that each task has its own separate and distinct program module, which is 
tested and maintained independently.  With no confusion in the intended interface with 
other system modules, this approach helps the designer construct well-defined inputs and 
outputs at implementation time.    
A module that has been well designed encapsulates a function or database and 
provides an interface that is always called upon by other modules for access to those 
functions or databases.  In a sense, the module is a “database” containing entity that holds 
different types of information.  To access this database, three types of interfaces can be 
defined: those that initialize the data, those that modify the data, and those that list the 
data.  Therefore, when a software engineer decides to build a new system using this 
approach, the designer needs to define the problem, define the databases, and then 
decompose these into modules.  This decomposition supports the understanding, analysis, 
and maintenance of the interfaces and can provide a basis for least privilege.  As an 
added benefit, modular programming uses coding techniques that allow modules to be 
written with little to no knowledge of the code in other modules; this allows the modules 
to be replaced or reassembled without having any effect on the system as a whole.  This 
is where modular programming becomes of value as it is applied to the production of 
large, complex systems such as operating systems. 
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Modular programming also provides some benefits to the software management 
team as illustrated by Parnas [PAR72].  From a managerial standpoint, the development 
time in producing a large system is shortened since separate groups of programmers can 
be assigned their own modules to work on with little to no communications with the 
others, and the interface of each module is well defined from the start.  Another benefit is 
product flexibility.  So long as the interface is stable, the module can undergo drastic 
internal changes without affecting the other modules.  The last benefit, comprehensibility, 
goes hand in hand with the management of complexity that will be discussed later.  In 
short, it should be possible for anyone to study the complete system one module at a time.  
This will help the person analyzing the system reach a better understanding of the system, 
its purpose and functionality, and its security.  Layered design also aids in this task.      
 2. Hierarchical Structuring 
To define a hierarchical structure, a partial ordering relation such as “uses” or 
“depends on” needs to be defined between the modules or programs [PAR72].  A partial 
ordering has the three properties of being 1) reflexive, 2) antisymmetric, and 3) transitive.  
For example, one can say that for a particular set of modules {x, y, and z} and the 
relation “depends on,” that these three conditions mean respectively that for all x, y, and z 
in the set: 1) x “depends on” x, 2) x “depends on” y and y “depends on” x implies x = y, 
and 3) x “depends on” y and y “depends on” z implies x “depends on” z.   
The managerial, product flexibility, and comprehensibility benefits discussed 
earlier could all be obtained if the modules were all on the same level without partial 
ordering.  However, if the modules are assembled on different levels, a partial ordering 
can be introduced giving two additional benefits to the system: 1) parts of the system are 
simplified because they use the services of the lower levels and 2) if the upper levels 
were cut off, the remaining lower levels are still considered as a usable and useful 
product [PAR72].  If the system were designed in such a way that the low level modules 
made use of the high level modules, no hierarchical structure would exist, making it very 
difficult to remove portions of the system and still have it be usable and useful.  Another 
issue with this lack of hierarchical design is error state.  Since higher layers “depend” on 
lower layers in a proper design, the inclusion of lower layers that “depend” on higher 
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layers creates a circular dependency problem that may loop indefinitely if an error is 
encountered.  For instance, if an error occurs in the lower modules, this error will 
propagate into the high modules, which is again propagated to the lower layer.  This 
creates an error state in which the system may never permit recovery.  This concern was 
presented in the auditing facility of the VMM security kernel [SEI90].   
The concepts of structuring and layering were also discussed by Dijkstra [DIJ68] 
who stated, “…the larger the project, the more essential the structuring!”  Following the 
strict levels of abstraction approach he introduced, the T.H.E. system hierarchy was 
broken up into five layers.  Since his system was small and straightforward, however, 
Dijkstra later commented that his layering decision might very well turn out to be of 
modest depth.  Schroeder, Clark, and Saltzer [SCH77] in their attempt to rid Multics of 
dependency loops also decided to use levels of abstraction in their security kernel design 
as a means of reducing complexity and providing precise and understandable 
specifications.  By making lower layers unaware of higher abstractions, the Multics 
kernel designers were able to reduce the total amount of interactions in the system and 
thereby reduce the overall complexity.  In addition, these levels of abstraction simplified 
the correctness argument and kernel debugging since each layer could be tested in 
isolation from all higher layers.   
3. Information Hiding 
A protected subsystem, as defined by Saltzer and Schroeder [SAL75], is a 
collection of procedures and data objects that is encapsulated in a domain of its own.  
This encapsulation allows the data structure of the protected object to be interpretively 
accessed; for example, it does not allow its internal organization to be accessible except 
by the internal procedures of the protected subsystem, which may be called only through 
specifically designated, domain entry points.  Parnas [PAR72] first introduced this idea of 
data hiding or information hiding as a design approach where the software is decomposed 
into modules that hide design decisions.  Therefore, the attention shifts away from the 
code used to implement the module and concentrates more on the signature or interface 
of the module.   
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Using information hiding in module design, data can only be manipulated through 
a simple, high-level, well-defined interface.  Consider the example of a file system that 
provides services to users and applications in the use of files.  Typically, the only way 
that a user or application may access files is through the file management system.  This 
relieves the user or programmer of the necessity of developing special-purpose software 
for each application and provides the system with a means of controlling its most 
important asset.  The implementation details are hidden from the program.  This concept 
could be applied to a kernel-based architecture, where the description should only include 
some of the kernel’s properties, but the rest should remain non-public or secret.      
E. THE SECURITY KERNEL 
One notion of designing an operating system around a kernel is described by 
Lampson [LAM76].  A kernel, by definition, is the part of the operating system that 
performs the lowest-level functions.  Today, in standard operating system design, the 
kernel implements operations such as synchronization, message passing, interprocess 
communication, and interrupt handling.  In the case of a security kernel, the consistent 
application of the reference monitor concept prevents penetration or subversion of 
security mechanisms with a high degree of assurance [BRI93].  
The reason behind kernel-based architectures is that since a kernel contains only 
that part of the system essential to meeting security requirements, it can be small, 
compared to the system as a whole, and therefore has a better chance of being correct.  
One of the main advantages of the kernel approach is the clear statement of purpose of 
the system.  Since a kernel is meaningful only with respect to some explicit requirements, 
these requirements serve as the statement of purpose of the system.  The other main 
advantage is the enhanced probability of correct operation.  Since the programs that are 
critical to the correct operation of the system are isolated in the kernel, a great deal of 
attention can be paid to getting this code right, and less attention can be paid to other 
system code that may be important but is not critical.  The relatively small size of the 
kernel significantly improves the chances of applying formal verification techniques 
freely to the programs in the kernel, where applying these techniques to the entire system 
would be difficult.   
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From the earlier discussions regarding the reference monitor concept, the security 
kernel is simply an implementation of the reference validation mechanism.  Some of its 
functions include creating subjects and objects, performing low-level resource 
management (controlling access to system resources), virtualizing the hardware, 
enforcing policy on every access request, and protecting itself from tampering.  Of the 
group of systems that have employed the security kernel concept, the SCOMP system 
was the first security kernel of its size and complexity to be formally verified, and the 
first to be evaluated against the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria [BEN84].  
Other security kernel implementations are found in the XTS [FER92] and GEMSOS 
[FER95].  
F. EVALUATION     
System evaluations need to be based on some set of criteria, and they need to be 
done by third party evaluators to remove any bias from the evaluation process.  From 
Dijkstra’s [DIJ68] experience, there exist only three stages in the building of a new 
system: conception to meet the specified requirements, construction to write the code, 
and verification to test all relevant states at each hierarchical level to provide for a 
flawless system.  In the T.H.E.-Multiprogramming System, Dijkstra’s [DIJ68] small team 
started at level 0, moving on to the next layer only after they were satisfied that the 
previous level had been thoroughly tested.  This was done at each layer by forcing the 
system into all the different states, and, at the same time, verifying that the system reacted 
in accordance with the specification.       
Taking from the work of Dijkstra as well as a number of others, evaluation 
criteria were formalized to help determine whether systems met a certain degree of 
assurance, intended to establish confidence that the systems as a whole are robust against 
attack.  In reference to the highest level of assurance (i.e., A1), Brinkley and Shell 
[BRI93] conjectured that with the amount of verification and validation criteria required 
of an Al system, a malicious programmer, who participates in any or all of the design, 
construction, distribution, and maintenance phases of the system, could never insert a 
trapdoor.  The Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) or the Orange 
Book and the Common Criteria (CC) are two examples of evaluation criteria that 
categorize these levels of assurance from highest to lowest. 
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The TCSEC (Orange Book) was developed by the National Security Agency 
(NSA) and adopted in 1985.  Addressing secure operating system design, a list of 
functional requirements (security policy and accountability) as well as assurance 
requirements (assurance and documentation) were carefully developed and categorized 
by TCSEC [DOD85].  To specify the amount or level of assurance and functional 
requirements met by a system, seven classes (A1, B3, B2, B1, C2, C1, D) were defined as 
an evaluation measure, with class A1 meeting all requirements and class D meeting none.  
Common to every class except class D, which provides essentially no security, testing 
and analysis for obvious flaws that bypass system security is performed, expanding the 
rigor and intensity with each increase in level.   
In class C, discretionary security protection and controlled access protection are 
the requirements for the respective C1 and C2 classes.  To provide for discretionary 
security (C1), the systems must be capable of controlling access on an individual user 
basis. For controlled access (C2), the system must provide individual accountability 
through login procedures, auditing, and resource isolation.  In addition, storage must be 
erased before being reassigned to another process. 
With the next level incorporating all the criteria below it, class B systems require 
labeled security protection, structured protection, and security domains as per the criteria 
for the respective B1, B2, and B3 class systems.  Labeled security (B1) is provided by 
systems that support the assignment of sensitivity (classification) labels to subjects and 
objects, and they must provide mandatory access controls.  For structured protection 
(B2), the systems must have a TCB based on a clearly defined formal security policy 
model, and it must be structured into protection-critical and non-protection-critical 
elements.  The system also must be subject to more stringent configuration management 
and trusted facility management, and must address covert channels and provide a trusted 
path between the user and the TCB for login authentication.  To meet the criteria of 
security domains (B3), the TCB must mediate all accesses, be tamperproof, and be 
engineered for analysis and testing.  Additionally, the system must incorporate significant 
use of layering, abstraction, and information hiding, auditing to signal alerts, and system 
recovery procedures. 
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Class A or A1 systems, the highest class that satisfies all the TCSEC criteria, 
requires verified protection to provide high assurance against subversion of the security 
mechanisms.  This criterion stipulates that formal methods of specification and 
verification must be used throughout the entire design process. 
After a careful review of the assurance requirements, one could note that many of 
these reflect the secure system design principles, including (1) system architecture 
(hierarchical structuring and information hiding), (2) security testing, (3) formal 
verification (use of security models), (4) trusted facility management (support for 
separation of operator privileges), (5) configuration management during development 
(code reviews before implementation into the baseline product), (6) trusted recovery 
(system returns to secure state after power failure), and (7) trusted distribution (hardware 
by trusted shippers and software by cryptographic checksums).  As illustrated in Figure 5, 
these criteria are broken down, giving a total of seven levels of assurance.  For each level, 
a symbol with an ‘X’ enclosed by a circle signifies that new requirements in a given 
criteria class must be satisfied to be in compliance with TCSEC.  For instance, a lower 
class such as C1 need only satisfy a given subset of the system architecture criterion that 
is required of a higher class like C2.  If an arrow is observed as an entry, the 
corresponding criteria required of the level below is the same for the given level in 
question.  For example, the system integrity criteria that class C1 systems need to satisfy 
are the same for all higher TCSEC levels.    
















Figure 5.   TCSEC Requirements for Assurance. 
The Common Criteria [CC99], which was developed by an international 
community and adopted in 1998, has a similar approach to assurance requirements that 
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guarantees the hierarchy of requirement sets as displayed by TCSEC.  In this evaluation 
method, a Protection Profile (PP), defined as a specific requirement set, is built from a 
“menu” of assurance requirements to fit the needs of the user.  This menu has 58 
primitive assurance requirements, which are called assurance components.  These are 
then grouped into 22 families, which are in turn grouped into six classes, including (1) 
configuration management, (2) delivery and operation, (3) development, (4) guidance 
documents, (5) life support cycle, and (6) tests.  To measure the amount of requirements 
met by a system, an evaluated assurance level (EAL1 – EAL7) is assigned.  In Figure 6, 
the numbers under the EAL columns specify which components of the family are 
required.  For example, EAL5 requires components 1 and 2 of the ate-cov (the assurance 
testing-coverage) family.  These requirements serve as a guide for the development, 
procurement, and basis of evaluation of information technology with security features. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
acm_aut 1 1 2 2
acm_cap 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
acm_scp 1 2 3 3 3
ate_cov 1 2 2 2 3 3
ate_dpt  1 1 2 2 3
ate_fun 1 1 1 1 2 2









Figure 6.   CC Evaluated Assurance Levels (EAL). 
G. ASSURANCE 
If an operating system has no assurance of correctness of policy enforcement or 
penetration resistance, can a user be held accountable for the unpreventable actions of 
software behaving maliciously?  A user needs to have confidence that both the policy and 
accountability objectives are being met by the system.  Hence, to establish that a 
protection mechanism is effective and self-protecting, one needs to check the accuracy, 
correctness, and completeness of the implementation [SAL75].       
The Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria defines the assurance control 
objective as follows: “Systems that are used to process or handle classified or other 
sensitive information must be designed to guarantee correct and accurate interpretation of 
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the security policy and must not distort the intent of that policy.  Assurance must be 
provided that correct implementation and operation of the policy exists throughout the 
system’s lifecycle” [DOD85].  Providing the highest levels of assurance will reveal 
intentional flaws (trapdoors) that have been deliberately introduced into the operating 
system.  Since it is undecidable to conduct searches of arbitrary code for such artifices of 
subversion that may be present somewhere in a million lines of code, the construction 
process must minimize this possibility to conclude that such artifices do not exist, while 
at the same time discovering and correcting accidental errors that could lead to system 
compromise.   
From all of the topics introduced thus far in this chapter, the main takeaway is that 
to establish a level of assurance, the operating system needs to be implemented in such a 
way that the user has confidence that it will enforce the security policy, and it needs to 
meet the expectations of the user with a certain degree of trust.  In the next section, a case 
study about the Multics Project will be reviewed to give an example of a successful 
attempt at building a secure operating system.   
H. THE MULTICS EXPERIENCE 
Saltzer and Schroeder [SAL75] have written that contemporary operating systems 
have a well-known tendency to be extraordinarily large and complex.  Intuitively, this 
size and complexity make the process of building a secure system hard due to the 
negative nature of security requirements.  These requirements, which are necessary and 
sufficient, demand that all unauthorized actions, whether accidental or malicious, need to 
be blocked (always invoked), the protection mechanisms in the design cannot be 
circumvented (tamperproof), and the implementation that reflects the security 
specification needs to be proven correct with a certain level of confidence (verifiable).  
The Multiplexed Information and Computing Service (Multics) Project team, which 
started as a cooperative effort among the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
the Bell Telephone Laboratories, and the Computer Department of General Electric later 
acquired by Honeywell [COR91], set out to tackle these issues as well as others in the 
pursuit of a secure, time-sharing system.   
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Parnas [PAR96] stated that if a group is given the opportunity to start a new 
project, their time spent studying previous efforts and identifying the reasons for their 
poor structure is likely to pay off in a far better, easier to maintain product.  Instead of 
reinventing the wheel, it makes more sense to avoid the same mistakes made before and 
take heed of those solutions that others have found.  Over the last 25 years, the lessons 
learned from the Multics experience have propagated throughout academia and 
government agencies affiliated with security and have come to be widely acknowledged 
as the proper way of building a secure system.  To distribute the knowledge gained from 
Multics, members of the project team documented the overall experience in a series of 
research papers.   
While working on the Multics Project at MIT, Schroeder [SCH75] discussed three 
primary goals focusing on the reduction of the size and complexity of security-relevant 
portions of the Multics system.  First, the team wanted to identify a minimum mechanism 
that must be correct to guarantee computer enforcement of the desired information access 
constraints.  Second, they wanted to simplify the structure of that mechanism to make the 
verification of its correctness auditable.  And third, they wanted to demonstrate by test 
implementation that the security kernel developed is capable of supporting all the 
functionality required of the Multics system completely and efficiently.  Later research 
would take a step deeper into the design aspects of the kernel.       
Schroeder, Clark, and Saltzer [SAL77] later redefined the design proposals to 
again concentrate on size and complexity reductions needed in the security kernel.  First, 
they wanted to remove protected supervisory functions that did not belong in the security 
kernel.  Second, they wanted to take advantage of the natural separation afforded by 
independent processes to help implement protected functions.  And third, they wanted to 
use a more structured programming technique to implement the security kernel in a way 
that would make it easier to verify.  With these goals in mind, the project team set out to 
define the proper way to construct a secure operating system.  
1. Constructing a Secure System 
In the early research phase of Multics, two different approaches were discussed as 
a methodology for constructing a secure system [SCH75].  The first that was explored 
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involved designing a formal specification for the desired system security properties 
followed by a top-down design and implementation process.  To prove the 
correspondence between the code implementation and the formal specification, formal 
program verification techniques would need to be employed to achieve a level of 
confidence comparable to that of a mathematician’s rigorous proof.  The step of fitting 
the security properties defined in the formal specification to that of the desired real-world 
properties (security policy) would be left to human intuition.  The second approach was 
related to the methodology of “penetrate and patch” that would be conducted by tiger 
teams.  With the goals of finding, cataloging, and repairing security flaws, this approach 
hoped to convince others of the computer security problem, create an understanding of 
the type of flaws that exist and can be exploited, and to assist in hardening the available 
systems from penetration attempts. 
In later research, the team created a multi-pronged approach to assist in the 
achievement of the redefined design goals discussed earlier in the introduction (the 
removal of functions that did not belong in the kernel, the implementation of protected 
functions that take advantage of the natural process separation, and the use of more 
structured programming techniques to ease code verification) [SCH77].  This approach 
had the following four concurrent processes: (1) use program verification wherever 
feasible, (2) assign small, expert teams of programmers to audit portions of the code for 
understandability and possible errors, (3) test the system for operational use to observe 
the system reliability, and (4) assign a tiger team the task of breaking into the system. 
 Once the approach was decided, other design issues needed to be researched for 
the proper solution.  The amount of common mechanism, which was discussed earlier as 
one of secure system design principles, was one of these that demanded much attention.  
2. Common Mechanism Risks 
To implement any explicit or implicit communication among computations, a 
common mechanism is required, such as those found in memory sharing, interprocess 
communication, or physical resource sharing.  These common mechanisms provide 
channels of information flow between different sensitivity levels of the system.  For 
instance, if operation A at the secret level can influence the value of some set of data 
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items that operation B at the confidential level notices, then the common mechanism that 
is said to exist between these two operations allows the conveying of sensitive 
information.  With this information channel open, operation A may directly write new 
information into a specific data item so that operation B can read it, or operation A may 
call a procedure at the confidential level that indirectly changes the state of the 
procedure’s internals, enabling operation B to take note of this change [SCH75].  If the 
intent of the system is to prohibit or constrain unauthorized communication between 
processes, then unconstrained access to these common mechanisms represents a risk.  
The functions that do incorporate common mechanisms in their implementation 
carry a built-in risk, which malicious users could work to their advantage if they can find 
an exploitable flaw in the mechanism.  As discussed above, these common mechanisms 
make it possible for the operation of one user to exert unauthorized observation or 
influence over the operations of another.  The simplifying conclusion to this problem has 
been that if a function does not require any type of outside communication, then its 
implementation should not use any common mechanisms.   
To avoid the exploitation of such vulnerabilities from the start of system design, 
the designers of the system must ensure common mechanisms are used only when 
necessary and that each common mechanism has no implementation flaws and no 
exploitable design vulnerabilities.  Additionally, the mechanism implementation needs to 
protect itself from any external tampering.  To provide for these requirements, a security 
kernel should be the least amount of common mechanism necessary to implement the 
sharing of information and resources that are desired in the system, or, more importantly, 
only those mechanisms that are necessary and sufficient.  But to verify the correctness 
and completeness of this implementation, it needs to be understandable, straightforward, 
and of good software design.   
Parnas [PAR96] commented that a program needs to be well structured, written in 
a consistent style, free of errors, and developed in such a way that each component is 
simple and organized.  Complexity and good engineering was also important for the 
designers of Multics.  “Reduced size and complexity of security-relevant software is a 
prerequisite to performing a convincing logical verification that a system correctly 
35 
implements the claimed access constraints, no matter what verification techniques are 
used.  Without such verification of correctness, a system cannot be considered secure” 
[SCH75].        
3. Complexity and Dependencies 
Much of the complexity of a system implementation can arise from the 
implementation of only a few of its features.  When one realizes that a particular feature 
causes complexity, it is time to review the importance of the feature and to see if a slight 
variation in its semantics might lead to a simpler implementation.  These minor 
adjustments or variations in the semantics of the user interface can make major 
differences in the complexity of the kernel implementation.   
The file system, memory management, and processor management portions of the 
supervisor of Multics, the bulk of the supervisor, were organized in six large modules 
[SCH77].  The problem that existed with these modules was the complicated cycles of 
dependency that were created in the kernel.  To eliminate many of these dependency 
loops, a complete restructuring of the file system, memory management, and process 
management portions of the supervisor was needed.  This required that the structure 
generated by the “depends on” relation between modules be a partially ordered set as 
discussed earlier in the argument first exploited in Dijkstra’s T.H.E. System.  Requiring a 
loop-free dependency structure allows system correctness to be established one module at 
a time.  In Dijkstra’s system, the correctness proof was done one layer at a time, which 
was simple to complete since T.H.E. was a deterministic system.  To get the loops out of 
Multics, type extension was found to be the best solution. 
Type extension, as defined by Schroeder, Clark, and Saltzer [SCH77], involves 
making all the modules of the system act as object managers, categorizing all the ways 
one module can depend on another, and organizing the modules in a loop-free 
dependency structure.  An object manager and the modules it depends on are solely 
responsible for maintaining the integrity of the managed objects.  Wirth [WIR95] 
describes using type extension as a way of providing a system with flexible extensibility, 
which guarantees that modules can be added later to the system without requiring 
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changes or recompilation.  Therefore, new modules could be added that incorporate new 
procedures based on calling existing ones.   
In the Multics system, a partition of dependencies into five categories (module 
component dependencies, name mapping dependencies, program storage dependencies, 
address space dependencies, and module interpreter dependencies) was considered 
complete and fairly intuitive for systems designed according to the rationale of type 
extension [SCH77].  Studies of Multics later showed that the impact on performance of 
the system from the kernel re-design, and related changes, was minimal.  Considering the 
modules that were redesigned for clarity and size reduction that had to remain in the 
kernel, such as memory management and process management, this small performance 
impact was especially interesting to members of the project team.  
To address the size issue, the Multics team found at the time that the number of 
source lines, independent of the language being used, was the most useful and consistent 
measure of the kernel size.  In Chapter 4, a discussion will demonstrate how archaic 
counting lines of code is in comparison to other complexity metrics that have been 
introduced recently and are quickly becoming widely used. 
With a review completed of the construction approaches, implementation issues, 
and complexity and size concerns, a discussion of the Multics security kernel design, 
goals, activities, and redesign conclusions will close this lessons learned, case study.    
4. Security Kernel Design 
Schroeder [SCH75] describes a security kernel as a minimal, protected core of 
software whose correct operation is sufficient to guarantee enforcement of the claimed 
constraints on access.  This is what he considers to be the structural basis for organizing a 
secure system.  The kernel must contain all those parts of the system that pertain to 
meeting the security requirements.  Therefore, there is no part of the system outside the 
security kernel that can cause the system not to meet its security requirements.  Also, the 
security kernel can contain only those parts of the system that are necessary to meet the 
security requirements.  Hence, the security kernel should not contain anything that does 
not pertain to the meeting of the security requirements.  With this architecture, the 
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security kernel can be small, compared to the system as a whole, and therefore has a 
better chance of being correct.    
a. Non-kernel Software 
Once the security kernel contains only what is necessary and sufficient to 
meet the security requirements, correctness of the remaining portions of the system (i.e., 
the non-kernel software) became an issue of debate for Multics.  Of these, four categories 
were discussed by Schroeder [SCH75], including (1) system-provided programs, (2) 
programs constructed by a user, (3) programs borrowed from other users, and (4) 
common mechanisms that a group of users sets up to implement some function.  It is true 
that these applications could still cause undesired release of information, modification of 
information, or denial of its use.  But, as commented by Schroeder [SCH75], if the kernel 
is correct, then these undesired results will not be unauthorized.  Therefore, it is apparent 
that the only mechanisms that are essential to verify correct are the common mechanisms 
of the security kernel. 
b. Multics Security Kernel Goals 
When work first began in engineering the security kernel for Multics, 
Schroeder [SCH75] constructed a list of goals that strictly dealt with the security kernel.  
First, the kernel should be sufficiently small, well structured, and easy to understand so 
that an expert could verify, with relative ease, its correctness through manual auditing.  
Second, since a common mechanism is required if one operation is to influence another, 
the kernel should embody all system-provided mechanisms that are common to more than 
one operation.  And third, to obtain all the mechanisms that should be included in the 
security kernel, the security specification should be viewed as a set of constraints on the 
interaction of the various operations that occur in a computer system.   
Therefore, the plan to produce a security kernel for Multics was viewed as 
three different activities, including (1) the removing of non-kernel mechanisms from the 
supervisor, (2) the restructuring of the remaining kernel, and (3) the partitioning of the 
kernel into multiple protection domains [SCH75].  
c. Categories of Security Kernel Activities 
The first activity involved taking functions not requiring implementation 
as common mechanisms out of the supervisor to be implemented in the user domains of a 
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process.  An example of this in Multics was removing file system functions from the 
supervisor.  The second dealt with the restructuring of the mechanisms that must remain 
in the kernel.  Such activities can reduce both the size and complexity of the kernel.  In 
some cases, a piece of the kernel can be eliminated and its function assumed by another 
kernel mechanism.  An example of this in Multics was the restructuring of the file system 
mechanisms that had to remain in the kernel.  And the third activity was the partitioning 
of the kernel into differently protected functional domains or security policy domains.  
This effort helped modularize the job of matching the kernel to the system security 
specification.   
d. Redefining Key Aspects of the Project 
After the work began on the Multics Project, many problems from a 
security point-of-view redefined key aspects of the project as well as raised some new 
interesting questions [SCH77].  The first problem was with the size of the central 
supervisor.  For example, the source code was over 54,000 lines of code in length and the 
number of programmers that contributed to the project ranged in the area of a hundred or 
more.  This made the task of conducting an integrity audit very difficult since it was 
necessary to inspect and understand every line of code in each and every program.  The 
second problem was related to the ad hoc security mechanisms provided by the first 
design.  Since some of these mechanisms, such as access control lists, rings of protection, 
and passwords, were not previously defined in any simple, underlying model of security, 
the job of auditing the supervisor was considered more difficult than that of the first 
problem because of the absence of a specification.  Presented with this situation, the 
auditor would have no idea what to look for since no model ever existed to verify the 
implementation. 
To redirect the project into solving these two concerns, the team decided 
to redefine the key aspects of the design.  First, simplify the supervisor so as to make it 
more feasible to audit and understand.  And second, provide a set of security functions 
that can be described by a simple, more straightforward formal model.  The only new 
concerns these brought about were the achievability of a successful audit, the usability of 
a security function defined by a formal model, and the changes in system performance 
when these new aspects were implemented.          
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e. Conclusions of the Kernel Design and Redesign 
After the initial design, the redefined aspects of the project concentrated 
specifically on the security kernel’s reduction in size and complexity.  As stated by 
Schroeder, Clark, and Saltzer [SCH77], “The initial projects of removing mechanisms 
from the Multics supervisor helped us understand what mechanisms needed to be present 
in a security kernel, but they did not help us understand how these pieces should be 
organized.”  Therefore, they concluded that in order to simplify the security kernel, it was 
important to develop an organizational rationale, like type extension as discussed above, 
for modularizing the required functions and fitting them into an understandable overall 
structure.   
From their accumulated work and research on Multics, Schroeder, Clark, 
and Saltzer [SCH77] agreed that the primary conclusion of the project was that a kernel 
of a general-purpose operating system can be made significantly simpler by first 
imposing a clear standard that defines what it should include.  This kernel concept, along 
with the type extension design discipline, appears to be a viable approach to security in 
large-scale systems.  And as an added benefit, there does not seem to be a significant 
performance loss arising from using simpler more modular designs.  Therefore, from 
their observations, a secure system need have no performance penalty. 
Parnas [PAR96] decided that the most important lesson is “up-front 
investment.”  In any software that he considered a jewel, the designers had spent obvious 
amounts of time thinking about the structure before writing the code.  In the case with 
Multics, the project spanned over four years and involved the work of several faculty 
members, graduate students, and staff members.  It proved to be a success by later being 
evaluated as a Class B2 [DOD85] high assurance system.  But as we will discuss in the 
next chapter, it was remarkable that such an ambitious system, which involved so many 









































IV. MANAGING COMPLEXITY IN OPERATING SYSTEM 
DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Most of the software we see or buy, in the opinion of Parnas [PAR96], is ugly, 
unreliable, hard to change, and certainly not something that Dijkstra would admire.  But 
why would commercial vendors place such undependable software on the market?  Wirth 
[WIR95] believes that the reason uncontrolled software growth has been widely accepted 
over the last two decades is because customers have trouble distinguishing between 
essential features and those that are just nice to have.  “Software vendors uncritically 
adopt almost any feature that users want,” claims Wirth. “When a system’s power is 
measured by the number of features, quantity becomes more important than quality.”  To 
stay competitive, the vendors add those features the market demands to sell their 
products.  Can vendors start over again and build an operating system that rids itself of 
such functionality, making it less complex, easier to understand, and easier to test to help 
provide the level of assurance demanded of a secure operating system evaluated under 
the Common Criteria or Orange Book?  The Unix operating system, which gathered the 
ideas of many previous efforts, is one such example of starting over and developing a 
well-structured system. 
As part of the Bell Laboratories’ Multics effort, Ken Thompson frustrated with 
the complexities of developing a large system under the cooperation of three large 
organizations (M.I.T., Bell Labs, GE) decided to start over on his own.  His strategy was 
clear and straightforward.  He wanted to start small and build up the ideas one by one as 
he saw how to implement them.  Since its advent, Unix has evolved and become 
immensely successful as the system of choice for workstations, giving rise to other open 
system variants such as Linux, OpenBSD, and FreeBSD and commercial descendents 
such as Solaris and OS/X.  From a security perspective, however, UNIX has several of its 
own flaws and vulnerabilities.   
Managing complexity while building a secure operating system requires the 
attention of all participants involved in every portion of the system lifecycle.  This 
chapter discusses complexity from a more abstract point-of-view followed by what 
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complexity exists in software.  Testing and the McCabe Cyclomatic Complexity metric 
will then be introduced and discussed to give an understanding of how they are coupled 
to help give the evaluator and user more confidence that the system behaves according to 
the requirements specification. 
B. BUILDING SYSTEMS THAT FAIL 
From his experience of working on the Compatible Time-Sharing System (CTSS) 
and the Multiplexed Information and Computing Service (Multics) system, Corbató 
[COR91] commented on the task of building ambitious systems: “It almost goes without 
saying that ambitious systems never quite work as expected.”  The question to ask when 
designing such systems, he pointed out, is not “if something will go wrong, but when it 
will go wrong?”  With this recurring problem affiliated with complex systems, Corbató 
presented his view that when a design team has a multitude of novel issues to contend 
with while building a system, mistakes are inevitable.  Corbató contributes these mistakes 
to what he defines as the properties of ambitious systems.  These properties can be 
summarized in five points: 
• They are often vast and have significant organizational structures going 
beyond that of simple replication.  
• They are frequently complicated or elaborate and are too much for even a 
small group to develop. 
• They are pushing the envelope of what people know how to do, and as a result 
there is always a level of uncertainty about when completion is possible.  
• They often break new ground, offer new services, and soon become 
indispensable. 
• They invite a flood of improvements and changes by virtue of having opened 
up a new domain of usage. 
Gathering from his experience, Corbató [COR91] abstracted the major causes of 
these properties of ambitious systems into five categories he referenced as the main 
sources of complexity, including (1) scale, (2) new design domains, (3) human usage of 
computer systems, (4) rapid change, and (5) the frailty of human users.   
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Scale in system design and construction is introduced when a project, which 
requires a large number of personnel, requires many levels of management.  With this 
company hierarchy, communication problems grow and add to the scale of the project as 
the size of the design team grows.   
New design domains become an issue when software engineers or designers of a 
system need to make a large transition in the way they think about solving a given 
problem related to the design and construction.  This could be related to language 
selection, the integrated development environment, or the method of design.   
Another complexity that needs to be addressed in system design and construction 
arises from human usage of computer systems, where if an individual places total trust in 
every computer user, he is vulnerable to the antisocial behavior of any malicious user.  
For instance, a complicated trade-off zone is presented to the user of a system when 
offered a various arrangement of trust and security mechanisms.  When considering 
productivity and convenience, for example, most users will select not to use passwords 
that are a nuisance to remember.   
Rapid change, which is often driven by technology improvements, causes changes 
in procedures or usage.  These quick modifications in standard operating procedures 
could create new vulnerabilities that were not considered in the original design; therefore 
this source of complexity also needs to be considered in system design and construction.   
Finally, the frailty of human users is considered a source of complexity in system 
design and construction since users are forced to deal with the multiplicity of 
technologies in modern life, which produce vast changes in their life-styles.  Because of 
the amount of stress that is created from this over stimulation of inputs, the natural 
defense of many is to increasingly depend on others to act as information filters.  Hence, 
instead of creating a knowledgeable user base that understands the inter-workings of a 
computer and the threats to its security, the end result is a population of “ignorant users” 
that only demand functionality and ease of use.    
C. SOFTWARE COMPLEXITY 
Parnas [PAR96] and Wirth [WIR95] have both argued that if a consumer is 
offered a system that provides “essential features” or a more useful tool with all the “bells 
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and whistles,” most users will choose the latter.  This has driven software vendors in the 
market to offer newer and better features, which in many cases offer no additional 
functionality, with each new release.  “Often,” Parnas notes, “software has grown large 
and its structure has degraded because designers have repeatedly modified it to integrate 
new systems or add new features.”  The disadvantage to this software design approach is 
the negative effect the added features have on the system complexity.  Since the code is 
repeatedly changed and modified to add the previously unanticipated features demanded 
by the market, the software design becomes sloppy, slow, and unreliable.  Processor 
speed and memory size used to be the way out for some vendors to compensate for this 
poor design, but considering the computer security problem we face today, the software 
needs to be as Wirth refers more “lean,” which will likely turn out to be smaller and 
faster.    
As opposed to indirect software measures such as project milestone status and 
reported system failures, software complexity is one branch of software metrics that is 
focused on the direct measurement of software attributes related to module design.  As 
pointed out by McCabe [MCC96], there are literally hundreds of software complexity 
measures, ranging from the simple, such as source lines of code, to the esoteric, such as 
the number of variable definition and usage associations.  The important criterion for the 
selection of these different metrics, however, is the uniformity of application.  This is 
what McCabe calls the open engineering criterion, where abstract models used to 
represent software systems should be as independent as possible of implementation 
characteristics such as source code formatting and program language.  The objective of 
this approach is to set certain complexity standards and interpret the resultant numbers 
uniformly across all projects and languages.  For instance, McCabe points out that the 
number-of-lines-of-code metric does not meet this criterion since it is extremely sensitive 
to programming language, coding style, and textual formatting of the source code.  
However, his cyclomatic complexity metric, which measures the amount of decision logic 
in a source code function, is independent of text formatting and nearly independent of 
programming language.  Unlike the basic complexity measure of line counting, the 
McCabe Complexity is possible since the same fundamental decision structures are 
uniformly applied in all function-oriented, programming languages. 
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Thirty years ago, Anderson [AND72] believed that the sheer size of contemporary 
operating systems, ranging on the order of 100,000 instructions, created an amount of 
complexity that made the static design and implementation virtually impossible to 
validate.  Moreover, when considering the dynamic behavior of the system, there is no 
practical way to check all of the possible control paths to verify that they produce correct 
results that are error-free.  Since complexity is a common source of error in software, 
McCabe [MCC96] decided to use this relationship directly to allocate testing effort.  
Leveraging this connection between complexity and error thereby concentrates the testing 
effort on the most error-prone software.   
D. COMPLEXITY AND TESTING 
According to the definition provided by McCabe [MCC96], software testing is the 
process of executing software and comparing the observed behavior to the desired 
behavior.  As commented by C.S. Lewis, “No issue is meaningful unless it can be put to 
the test of decisive verification” [PET00].  The major goal of this verification process, as 
viewed by McCabe, is the discovery of errors in software.  With the absence of such 
errors, the secondary goal is to help build confidence in the proper operation of the 
software.  But what does it mean if a testing process detects no errors?  As pointed out by 
Dijkstra [DIJ68], “Testing can show the presence, but never the absence of errors in 
software.”  When verifying and validating an operating system, this makes the problem 
of addressing the malicious software threat hard since testing cannot demonstrate the 
absence of artifices or trapdoors.  Does this mean that the software is high quality or the 
testing process is low quality?  From McCabe’s observations, many errors are found at 
the beginning of the testing process, with the observed error rate decreasing as errors are 
fixed.  As the rate approaches zero, statistical techniques are used to determine a 
reasonable point to stop.  In reality, however, this stopping point is usually dictated by a 
vendor’s delivery date to the market.  This common approach by commercial vendors has 
its weaknesses, as argued by McCabe.  First, since the testing effort cannot be predicted 
in advance, the schedule can expire long before the error rate drops to an acceptable 
level.  And second, since the statistical model only predicts the estimated error rate for 
the underlying test case distribution being used, it may have little or no connection to the 
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likelihood of errors that are manifesting or present when the system is delivered.  Other 
methodical approaches to software testing may help detect the errors more effectively.  
Requirements analysis is another approach discussed by McCabe [MCC96] to 
detect the errors in the software.  Using this technique, each requirement specification is 
converted into a set of test cases.  Then, at least one of these test cases within the scope of 
each requirement is executed to verify the system behavior.  According to McCabe, 
however, this procedure does not provide a complete solution.  Since the requirements 
are written at a much higher level of abstraction than the code that implements it, much 
more detail can exist in the latter.  Therefore, testing only at the requirements level may 
miss many sources of error in the software since only a portion of the implementation is 
actually being tested.   
Another approach called white box testing uses the software implementation itself 
rather than the requirement specifications to guide the testing efforts [MCC96].  This 
technique, also called glass box, code-based, or structural testing, focuses on the detailed 
design of the software rather than on the functions.  This is accomplished by checking 
primary statements, paths, and branches for correct execution.  Black box testing, in 
comparison, hides the contents of the box and focuses only on the inputs, outputs, and 
principle functions of the software module.  A benefit to the white box approach is that 
the entire software implementation is considered throughout the testing effort; however, 
if the software does not implement one or more requirements, the testing effort will not 
detect the portions of the code that are missing [MCC96].  This convinced McCabe that 
in order to account for these concerns, white box and requirements analysis testing would 
need to be coupled together to verify the system behavior.  
Although there are many effective testing techniques that exist or are being 
developed through research, it is also important to design and construct software that can 
be effectively tested.  By limiting the decision logic of each program module during 
development, the amount of complexity will be reduced directly versus the common, 
inadequate approach of controlling the number-of-lines-of-code.  McCabe [MCC96] 
states that the key requirement of white box or structured testing is that all decision 
outcomes must be exercised independently during testing.  To measure the work 
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associated with this requirement, he introduced his cyclomatic complexity metric for 
modules, which is proportional to the number of tests required for a software module. 
E. MCCABE CYCLOMATIC COMPLEXITY METRIC 
1. Definition and Applications 
A straightforward way to assess the complexity of a method is to count the 
number of decisions in the flow diagram representation of the diagram.  The measure 
proposed by McCabe [MCC96] computes a number that represents the amount of 
decision logic in a single software module based entirely on the structure of the 
software’s control flow graph.  The form of these decision paths and their number 
strongly relate to the anticipated difficulties encountered when testing and maintaining 
the software.   Also since the cyclomatic complexity is intended to be independent of 
language and language format, this measure provides a single ordinal number that can be 
compared to the complexity of any other program.  To understand the definition of 
cyclomatic complexity, a brief review of some graph theory will be presented. 
Using graph theory as a mathematical description, the cyclomatic complexity 
represents the same property as the cyclomatic number utilized in a directed graph 
[MCC96].  A directed graph (or digraph) G is a pair (V, E), where V is a finite set and E 
is a binary relation on V.  The set V is called the vertex set of G, and its elements are 
called vertices.  The set E is called the edge set of G, and its elements are called edges.  
Hence, the definition in graph theory of the cyclomatic number, v, comes in the form 
v(G) = e – n + 2p, where G indicates that the complexity is a function of the graph, e is 
the number of edges, n is the number of nodes, and p is the number of connected entry 
and exit nodes in the graph. 
Since each software module corresponds to a single function or subroutine in a 
typical language, they can be used effectively as a design component via a single entry 
and exit point mechanism [MCC96].  Therefore, in a control flow graph describing the 
logical structure of software modules, the graph consists of nodes, which represent 
computational statements or expressions, and edges, which represent transfer of control 
between nodes.  Additionally, as explained by McCabe, these program control flow 
graphs are connected via a directed “virtual edge,” which associates the exit node to the 
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entry node.  From the formula of the cyclomatic number, the existence of one virtual 
edge means that p is equal to one, reducing the previous form to v(G) = e – n + 2, which 
defines the cyclomatic complexity.  Figure 7 illustrates how this cyclomatic complexity is 
calculated from the Euclid module, control flow graph.  The source code is provided for 
amplification.   
Number of Nodes:  14
Number of Edges:  15
v(G) = e – n + 2
v(G) = 15 – 14 + 2 


































Euclid (int m, int n) {
int r;




} // end if
r = m % n; /* m modulo n */
while (r != 0) {
m = n;
n = r;
r = m % n; /* m modulo n */
} // end while
return n;
















Figure 7.   Euclid Module Code With Cyclomatic Complexity [MCC96]. 
As observed from Figure 7, each possible execution path of a software module 
has a corresponding path from the entry to the exit node of the control flow graph of the 
module.  As defined by McCabe [MCC96], the cyclomatic complexity is the minimum 
number of paths that can, in linear combination, generate all possible paths through the 
module.    With regard to testing, therefore, one only requires the cyclomatic complexity 
number of paths to cover all of the relevant edges of each software module.  This 
resulting measure can be used in development, maintenance, and reengineering situations 
to develop estimates of risk, cost, or program stability.   
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As demonstrated by McCabe [MCC96], the correlation that exists between a 
module’s cyclomatic complexity and its error frequency can be applied as a strong 
indicator of its testability, as well as its understandability and receptiveness to 
modification.  From a software life-cycle standpoint, McCabe noted that cyclomatic 
complexity could be applied in several ways, including (1) code development risk 
analysis, (2) change risk analysis in maintenance, (3) test planning, and (4) reengineering.  
2. Limiting the Cyclomatic Complexity 
The Waterfall Model, described as a sequence of activities in a software lifecycle 
that begins with concept exploration and concludes with maintenance and eventual 
replacement, is one example of a software lifecycle process.   From the model’s various 
activities as described by McCabe [MCC96], maintenance turns out to be the most 
expensive of all these, with typical estimates ranging from 60% to 80% of the total cost.  
In this phase, complexity tends to increase due to the increased number of error 
corrections and functional enhancements, which are accomplished more often by adding 
code rather than deleting it.  McCabe also makes note that these changes also increase the 
complexity of each module since it is usually easier to “patch” the logic in an existing 
module rather than introducing a new module altogether.   
The maintenance phase, however, may not be the only step in the life cycle that is 
affected by this increase in complexity.  The design and implementation phases could 
also create overly complex modules that are error-prone, hard to understand, hard to test, 
and hard to modify.  Therefore, deliberately limiting complexity at all stages of software 
development helps avoid the pitfalls associated with high complexity software.  From his 
research in software testing and measuring complexity, McCabe [MCC96] explains that 
the most effective policy for developers with a solid understanding of both the mechanics 
and the intent of the complexity limitation is the following: “For each module, either 
limit cyclomatic complexity to 10…or provide a written explanation of why the limit was 
exceeded.”  An organization can pick a complexity limit greater than 10, but only if (1) it 
is sure it knows what it is doing, and (2) it is willing to devote the additional design 
analysis and testing effort required by the more complex modules.  A chart of threshold 
values is provided in Figure 8 on the next page to serve as a guideline for developers.  
The original limit of 10, as proposed by McCabe [MCC96], has significant supporting 
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evidence, but limits as high as 15 have been used successfully as well.  Limits greater 
than 10 should be reserved for projects that have several operational advantages over 
typical projects.  Some of these advantages include experienced staff, formal design, a 
modern programming language, structured programming, code walkthroughs, and a 
comprehensive test plan. 
Cyclomatic Complexity Risk Evaluation
1-10 a simple program, without much risk
11-20 more complex, moderate risk
21-50 complex, high risk program
greater than 50 untestable program (very high risk)
 
Figure 8.   Threshold Values. 
An attempt to limit complexity affects the allocation of code among individual 
software modules.  For instance, limiting the amount of code in any one module might 
tend to create more modules for the same application.  From a software engineering 
standpoint, however, the usual factors to consider when allocating code among modules 
are the cohesion and coupling principles of structured design as discussed in Chapter 3.  
This means that the ideal module needs to perform a single conceptual function (high 
cohesion), and do so in a self-contained manner without interacting with other modules 
except to use them as subroutines (low coupling).  Thus, complexity limitation attempts 
to quantify an “except where doing so would render a module too complex to understand, 
test, or maintain” clause to the structure design principles [MCC96].   
Other archaic rationale for limiting complexity, like reducing a software module 
to one page to make it more manageable, have no direct connection to a module’s actual 
complexity and should not be used as a measurement of such [MCC96].  For instance, 
one control flow graph may have 282 lines of code with a cyclomatic complexity of one; 
whereby a second flow graph represented by a 30-line module may have a cyclomatic 
complexity of 28.   As this example makes clear, there is no consistent relationship 
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between the number-of-lines-of-code and complexity.  Although the number-of-lines-of-
code is an important size measure, it is still considered a crude measurement for 
complexity. 
With a review of its definition and applications completed, some practical and 
simplified cyclomatic complexity calculations will be introduced to aid in module design 
and implementation. 
3. Simplified Complexity Calculations 
McCabe [MCC96] explains two ways to manually calculate the cyclomatic 
complexity of a program: (1) counting the decision predicates and (2) counting the flow 
graph regions.   
On a control-flow graph, a binary decision predicate (i.e. “yes” or “no”) appears 
as a node with exactly two edges flowing out of it.  Starting with one and adding the 
number of such nodes yields the cyclomatic complexity.  For multi-way decisions (i.e. 
switch or case statements), the number added is one less than the number of edges out of 
the decision node.   
Count the Decisions:
1. Always start with 
one unit of complexity.
2. Binary:  
1 + 1 + 1 = 3
3. Multiway:  
1 Four-Way = 3
Cyclomatic Complexity:





















Figure 9.   Binary and Multi-way Decisions [MCC96]. 
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As illustrated in Figure 9 depicting a flow graph with three binary decisions and 
one multi-way decision, we always start with one unit of complexity, each binary 
decision then contributes one unit of complexity for a total of three, and the four-way 
decision node adds three units for a cyclomatic complexity equal to seven.     By counting 
from the source code, this often provides the easiest way to measure and control 
complexity during development, since complexity is measured before the module is 
actually complete.  The important thing to remember when calculating complexity from 
source code, however, is to be consistent with the interpretation of language constructs in 
the flow graph.  For instance, “if” and “while” conditional statements should add a value 
of one to the complexity, yet boolean operators within a conditional statement such as 
“and” and “or” should add nothing. 
Count the Regions:
1. Always start with 
the infinite region.


























Figure 10.   Planar Control Flow Graph With Regions [MCC96]. 
 When no edges cross, the control flow graph is defined as planar.  As depicted in 
Figure 10, this planar graph can then be divided into R regions, including the infinite 
region outside the graph.  In this scenario, the simplified formula for cyclomatic 
complexity is just R.  Euler’s Formula, given as V – E + F = 2, where V is the number of 
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vertices, E is the number of edges, and F is the number of faces, can be applied to any 
three-dimensional shape.  For instance, a tetrahedron has V = 4 vertices, E = 6 edges, and 
F = 4 faces, yielding 4 – 6 + 4 = 2.  As described by McCabe [MCC96], using R (the 
number of regions) to represent F (the number of faces), Euler’s Formula can be 
rewritten for application to all planar graphs n – e + R = 2.  Rearranging this formula 
gives the form R = e – n + 2, which matches the previous definition of the cyclomatic 
complexity.  Thus, for a planar flow graph, counting regions gives a quick visual method 
for determining complexity.  Using the flow graph in Figure 10 as an example, we start 
by counting the infinite region outside of the graph followed by counting the total number 
of internal regions, giving a cyclomatic complexity equal to seven.  Since the control 
flow graphs in Figures 9 and 10 are identical, the method of counting the regions agrees 
with the method of counting the decision predicates used in the previous example.   
 Although the cyclomatic complexity can be calculated manually for small 
program suites, automated tools are preferable for most operational environments.  
4. Automated Tool 
Automated tools are the most efficient and reliable way to determine complexity.  
In a matter of minutes, complexity can be determined for hundreds of modules spanning 
thousands of lines of code.  McCabe [MCC96], however, notes that in order for 
automated graphing and complexity calculation to be possible, the technology needs to be 
language-sensitive.  Therefore, there must be a front-end source parser for each language, 
with variants for dialectic differences.  This type of technology exists today and will be 
described in Chapter 5 with a description of the Imagix4D reverse engineering and 
documentation tool. 
Another example of this technology is a plug-in, which calculates the cyclomatic 
complexity metric for Pascal source code, designed by Derrick [DER97] for the Code 
Warrior integrated development environment (IDE).  The score that the program provides 
is the number of decision points gathered from the number of conditional statements (i.e., 
if, while, repeat, for, and, or, and case statements) in a routine plus one.  Figure 11 shows 
the design and implementation scores that a programmer could use to limit complexity 
using the Code Warrior, cyclomatic complexity plug-in. 
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Scores Design Plug-in Implementation
8 - 10 Fairly simple Gives user a note
11 - 19 Need to start thinking about simplifying Gives user a warning
>= 20 Need to simplify the routine Gives user a error
 
Figure 11.   Complexity Plug-in Design and Implementation Scores. 
The tools that are available for studying complexity are useful in software 
development, but McCabe [MCC96] makes an important observation regarding the use of 
any of these methods after the design and implementation phases are already complete: 
“The feedback from an automated tool may come too late for effective development of 
new software.  Once the code for a software module (or file, or subsystem) is finished 
and processed by automated tools, reworking it to reduce complexity is more costly and 
error-prone than developing the module with complexity in mind from the outset.”  
Therefore, instead of pushing complexity-related issues to later phases of the software 
life cycle like the maintenance phase, manual and automated techniques as discussed in 
this chapter need to be applied for complexity analysis to help design and build easy to 
understand software.   
Wirth [WIR95] states that reducing complexity and size must be the goal in every 
step of the design, including system specification, design, and detailed programming.     
This would bring one to logically infer that if a system is already constructed, it may be 
too late to go back and try to fix the complexity problems.  Would it benefit the vendor 
and its design team to start again with a new software project that confirms and controls 
complexity throughout all of its development?  After a discussion of the Imagix4D’s 
capabilities, an experiment that compares the complexity of different operating systems 










V. IMAGIX 4D REVERSE ENGINEERING TOOL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There are several ways to calculate complexity of applications and operating 
systems in practice, ranging from counting decision predicates by hand, as discussed in 
the last chapter, to using a tool that performs the calculations in an automated, more 
error-free manner.   When searching for a tool that specifically automates cyclomatic 
complexity calculations, Imagix 4D is the ideal application.  From its description, Imagix 
4D is a reverse engineering and documentation tool for legacy C and C++ software.  As 
part of its wide functionality, the tool can be used on any level to rapidly check or 
systematically study software, including architectural details, functional dependencies, 
control structures, and data usage.  By automating the browsing and analysis of the code, 
Imagix 4D speeds the comprehension of programs that are large, complex, or unfamiliar.   
The following chapter will give an overview of the Imagix 4D tool starting with a 
description of its underlying database model, the entity-relationship-attribute symbols 
utilized by the database, the views and displays that present the information stored in the 
database, and the various modes that are available to browse, explore, and analyze the 
software code.  Throughout this synopsis, screen shots will demonstrate the tool’s 
functionality by analyzing a simple C++ program called “Vehicle Watch,” which was 
developed as the final project in a beginner’s programming class.  This program tracks 
vehicle information such as speed and heading.  The next chapter will present an analysis 
of other software that is not as easy to understand – operating system source code.  From 
this study, we plan to show a complexity comparison between an open source, general 
operating system like Linux and a commercially available, embedded operating system 
like Talisker. 
B. DATA MODEL  
The underlying database, which is employed by the Imagix software, uses an 
entity-relationship data model.  The symbols (entities) in the program code, their 
dependencies to other symbols (relationships), and specific information about any of the 
symbols (attributes) constitute the most natural way of handling and presenting the data 
about the program being analyzed.   
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When parsing the source code, all of the entities, attributes, and relationships are 
collected and updated in the database.  The Imagix 4D database recognizes a wide range 
of symbol types, including file directories, program files (binary, C, C++, executable, 
header, and library), classes, functions, macros, variables, and data types.  Figure 12, 
which depicts the “Set View” options for Imagix 4D’s Graph window, illustrates the 
various types of symbols available.  The purpose and functionality of the Graph window 
will be explained in the next section.   
 
Figure 12.   Graph Window - Set View Options. 
Associated with each of these symbols is a set of relationships to other symbols.  A wide 
variety of relationship types are collected and updated, including (1) function “calls” 
function, (2) file “declares” symbol, (3) file “contains” symbol, (4) variable “has type” 
data type, (5) file1 “includes” file2, (6) functions “reads” variable, and (7) function “sets” 
variable relations.  Figure 12 also shows a list of these relationships that are possible to 
model in Imagix 4D.   
For each symbol in the database, the reverse engineering tool collects a number of 
attributes as well.  Of interest are the function metric attributes, which are illustrated in 
Figure 13 showing the different attributes available from the “List Options” menu.  Of 
the metric options, “callers” is defined as the number of other functions that call a 
particular function.  “Complexity” is based on the cyclomatic complexity metric as 
defined by McCabe.  The total number-of-lines in a function is given by the “lines” 
metric, while the “LOC” metric is the number-of-lines-of-code containing tokens in the 
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function.  And concerning the length of a file, the number-of-lines containing comments 
are given by the “LOCmmts” metric.  To generate profile data, a “frequency” metric 
gives the number of times a function was called, a “coverage” metric gives the 
percentage of blocks of code that were executed, and a “time” metric gives the time spent 
executing the function.  Besides functional metrics, other attributes such as file size and 
modification date can also be included in the Imagix 4D database.       
 
Figure 13.   List Options Menu for Imagix 4D Database. 
Information from the database is used to generate the various displays as well as 
support Imagix’s knowledge-based querying.         
C. VIEWS AND DISPLAY WINDOWS 
The display windows are the central focus of Imagix 4D’s user interface.  Taking 
advantages of visualization technologies to convey information from Imagix 4D’s 
comprehensive database, these windows enable a user to achieve a fast and accurate 
understanding of the software.  Since the views and displays present several different 
perspectives of the program simultaneously, their complementary nature enables a user to 
grasp the inherent design of the software. 
1. Graph Window 
The central window for displaying information is the Graph window.  The 
window shows a group of symbols (such as particular functions, classes, variables, and/or 
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types) in the software, and how they relate to each other.  For a given symbol, one is able 
to see at a glance how it interacts with other symbols.   
 
Figure 14.   Graph Window and List Window. 
The Graph window helps a user visualize and understand the software by 
pictorially representing the symbol and relationship data contained in the Imagix 4D 
database.  In the view presented in Figure 14, functions are displayed as indicated by the 
selected radio button shown at the bottom left hand corner of the Graph window.  This 
example shows the hierarchy of calls between functions, which will be utilized in our 
comparative analysis later in Chapter 6.  The setting and reading of variables can also be 
visualized by selecting the appropriate checkbox.   
In the Graph window and the Graph Symbols Key (shown in Figure 15), all the 
lines drawn between symbols representing the relationships have arrowheads.  These 
indicate the direction of the “dependency” as directed graphs as discussed in the previous 
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chapter.  For instance, when a function is said to call another function, an arrow from the 
calling function to the called function so indicates.  This dependency direction is also 
given by the layout of the graph.  In general, the symbols at the top of the graph tend to 
have dependencies upon the symbols lower in the graph.   There are times, however, 
when a user will find a traditional 2D layout more appropriate for the data being 
observed.  This 2D layout, which can be selected at the bottom of the Graph window as 
illustrated in Figure 14, is similar to the 3D view except that the dependencies tend to be 
displayed left to right, rather than from top to bottom. 
 
Figure 15.   Graph Symbols Key. 
One option available with the 2D view is the cross-reference layout, also shown 
as an option in the Graph window of Figure 14.  When this option is checked, only the 
relationships that have a direct dependency with a pre-selected symbol are drawn, while 
suppressing all other relationships from the graph.  For instance, if “main” were selected 
by clicking on its function symbol in the graph of Figure 14, it would become the center 
of focus when the cross-reference layout is selected in the 2D view.  In the resulting 
display, symbols that directly depend on “main” will have arrows drawn into the selected 
symbol, appearing to the left of “main,” while those that “main” directly depends on will 
have arrows drawn out of “main,” appearing to the right.  In this example, “main” has no 
“into” dependencies; therefore, it would only have arrows drawn in the “out of” direction, 
demonstrating what functions and variables it directly depends on.   
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2. Graph Symbols Key 
The Graph Symbols Key, similar to the legend of a map, is a useful tool for 
keeping track of the symbols and the relationships that can be displayed in the current 
view.  As illustrated in Figure 15, the key uses shapes and colors to indicate these 
different types.  For instance, blue cubes are used for functions, and green pyramids 
represent data variables.  Color is also used to indicate the type of relationship between 
two symbols.  For example, the arrow representing a function calling another function is 
drawn in red, a function reading a variable appears as light purple, and a function that is 
setting a particular variable is shown in aquamarine. 
3. List Window 
While the Graph window shows the symbols and their relationships, the List 
window, as shown on the right side of Figure 14, complements the Graph window by 
displaying various characteristics about the symbols themselves.  In particular, a user can 
utilize the List window to understand the context of a symbol and examine its attributes.  
For example, since the Imagix 4D database tracks where each symbol is declared, a user 
can use the List window to examine the hierarchy of containers.  Hence, it can be 
observed in Figure 14 that variable “car” used in function “add” is defined in file 
“proj5.cpp” located in directory “test”.  The “contains” adjust buttons below the List 
window enables one to control how many levels of containers are shown.  Other symbol 
attributes like the number-of-lines-of-code in a function and its complexity, the scope of a 
certain variable, and the date a file was last modified can also be presented in the List 
window by selecting the “attr” checkbox located in the bottom right of the window. 
4. File and Class Browsers 
The Imagix 4D browsers provide information about files or classes from different 
perspectives.  As shown in Figure 16, which depicts a typical file browser, the “Index” 
panel contains a list of all the files that have been loaded into the database, including 
source files and header files.  The “Members” panel contains a listing of all the members 
defined in the current file as well as those that are only declared.  These can be presented 
in the order they appear in the file, by name, or by type.  A user of the application can 
also use the browser filter capabilities to limit the list to just those members of particular 
types, scopes, and origins.  Finally, the “Relationships” panel shows how the current file 
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is related to other files in the database.  During the examination of a file, a user may want 
to know what other files may include this one, or what other files have functions that call 
members of this file.  As shown in Figure 16 with the “includes” relationship, a user can 
select other types that are available, including (1) calls, (2) sets, (3) reads, and (4) has 
type.  
 
Figure 16.   File Browser. 
5. Flow Chart 
The Flow Chart, as illustrated in Figure 17, shows the internal flow of control 
within a function.  In this example, the decision logic of the “main” function is presented.  
For other more complex functions, which may consist of hundreds of lines-of-code, this 
capability can help the user visualize the internal logic of the routine.  As also shown in 
Figure 17, the Flow Chart Symbols that can be selected help explain the symbols used in 
the control flow diagram.  For instance, diamonds represent decision points; in-line 
blocks of code are shown as squares; and lines that connect the symbols show control 
flow. 
An additional feature that helps the user see where a specific line of code fits in 
the overall logic flow of a function is the Flow Chart’s link to the File Editor.  When the 
user clicks on a specific symbol, the cursor in the File Editor goes to that location in the 
source code.  Likewise, clicking on the source code causes the matching symbol in the 
Flow Chart to be highlighted in red.  By being able to see the source code in combination 
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with the logic of the function, one is able to understand and modify the function much 
more quickly and accurately.   
 
Figure 17.   Flow Chart and Symbols. 
6. File Editor 
Imagix 4D’s built-in file editor enables the user to achieve a better understanding 
of a program while examining and modifying its source code.  An example of this 
capability is shown in Figure 18 where the “main” function is listed in its entirety.  
To visually improve the level of understanding, color-coding is employed to 
distinguish between comments and actual code.  This color-coding is also extended to 
symbols to aid in determining how they are defined and used in the code.  To make  
browsing of the code more straightforward, hypertext-like navigation based on the 
information contained in the underlying database is achieved by tightly linking the file 
editor to other displays.  For instance, by double-clicking on a colored symbol, the file 
editor immediately browses to the file and line number where that symbol is defined.  
This is also possible from the Graph window, the List window, the Browsers, the Flow 
Chart or a given Report that can be generated by the application.   
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Figure 18.   File Editor. 
Another form of navigation, which cycles through all of the locations where a 
symbol is used, is achieved with the “Next” and “Prev” reference buttons located on the 
icon bar of the File Editor as shown in Figure 18.  With these tools, the user avoids 
64 
having to spend the time and effort trying to remember where things are located and can 
focus instead on the understanding and possible modification of the source code. 
7. Reports   
Leveraging the information in its database, Imagix 4D can generate 
comprehensive reports and documentation about the software as shown in Figure 19.  In 
this typical report, all of the function information is listed in order of its complexity.  
Other options for these information reports about functions include organizing the 
information: by name, by LOC, by lines, and by callers.  Additionally, file and class 
summary as well as file information reports can be generated to include similar attributes 
as seen in the function report.   
 
Figure 19.   Typical Report – Function Information. 
D. MODES OF OPERATION 
To ease the task of program understanding, Imagix 4D operates in four different 
modes, including (1) browse, (2) explore, (3) analyze, and (4) control flow modes.  
Browse mode helps the user to quickly navigate through the code to examine the key 
relationships between functions, classes, variables, and types.  The explore mode enables 
the systematic study of the software on any level from its high level architecture to the 
details of its build, procedural, data, and module dependencies.  The analyze mode 
examines the quantitative characteristics of the software such as giving a visual indication 
of the complexity metric level of the design structure using predefined threshold values.  
65 
Finally, the control flow mode provides insight into the sequence and conditionality of 
function calls and variable usage. 
All of the view and display functionality discussed thus far are all available in the 
four modes of operation.  In the presentation that follows, additional capabilities affiliated 
with each mode in particular will be discussed for understanding and continuity. 
1. Browsing the Source Code 
When browsing the source code, the only other functionality permitted is the 
querying of the database using the “Find Query” and the “Grep Query” commands 
provided.  When a “Find” is executed, the display windows focus on the results of the 
query.   
 
Figure 20.   Find Query in Browse Mode. 
The query, as illustrated in Figure 20, consists of a specific “Name,” a 
“Program_Element” type, and a “Function” subtype.  “Files” is a second type that may be 
chosen where “Binary_File,” “Directory,” and “Source File” are some of its subtypes.  
Other “Program_Element” subtypes include the set {Class, Macro, Type, and Variable}.  
If a user executes the find query shown in Figure 20, the  “main” function symbols in 
both the graph and list windows (illustrated in Figure 14) would become highlighted after 
the Imagix 4D tool searched its database for matches to the query. 
The results of a “Grep” query, as illustrated in Figure 21, are listed in the search 
result window of the “Grep Tool” function available in all modes of Imagix 4D.  In Unix, 
if “grep foo bar” was entered at the command-line, the system would return all the lines 
that contain a string matching the expression “foo” in the file “bar.”  In Imagix 4D, this 
function enables a user to easily jump to the files where the “greped” strings are located.  
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After a grep operation is performed, the user can display these returned strings by 
selecting the “Grep” option available in the graph window as illustrated in Figure 14.  
This will result in a display of all the returned strings organized by location where they 
are declared.  This is accomplished by listing them under a corresponding function, 
module, or file symbol.  This list can be used as a basis for browsing to the actual 
occurrences of the string.  In Figure 21, the tool is used to find all the occurrences of the 
expression “memory management” in the Linux operating system. 
 
Figure 21.   Grep Query in All Modes.  
2. Exploration and Analysis of the Source Code 
In explore and analyze modes, an additional capability available to the user is the 
tracing of software hierarchies in the source code.  For instance, since the arrows on the 
relationship lines indicate the direction of the dependencies, a user can trace the hierarchy 
of dependencies quickly and simply by using the “Traverse Up” and “Traverse Down” 
functions available in these modes.  These commands can also help find circular 
dependencies in the software hierarchies, as will be later demonstrated in Chapter 6.  
Extending the database querying capabilities discussed earlier in the browse 
mode, the “Find” command in explore and analyze modes can quickly identify all 
symbols that meet a given criteria a user specifies by using the additional “Options…” 
menu item not available in browse mode.  As shown in Figure 22, for instance, a user can 
base a “Find” query on certain attributes related to the symbol’s name, type, scope, file 
location, and quantitative characteristics such as lines-of-code or complexity.  This 
command will determine what symbols meet the criteria, and where they exist within the 
context of the current view.   
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Figure 22.   Find Query Options in Explore and Analyze Modes. 
Another feature of explore and analyze modes is the capability to control and 
focus the content of inquiries into the source code to try and find more detailed 
information.  For example, once a user has identified information of interest using the 
“Traverse”, “Find”, and “Grep” commands, he may want to remove unnecessary 
information and focus his view.  To assist the user in accomplishing this simplification, 
data filtering functions (i.e., the “Isolate” function) are available.  A complementary 
approach to this is to start with an overly simple view and add pertinent information (i.e., 
the “Add” function).  Using either approach, the user can decide to focus his view in a 
way that follows his natural train of thought.  In Figure 23, the menu for the “Add” 
command illustrates that symbols with a given name or type can be added “anywhere” in 
the graph; or relative to the symbol specified, symbols can be added in full or incremental 
steps in the up or down direction of the system hierarchy.   
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Figure 23.   Add Function in Explore and Analyze Modes. 
“Group” commands can also give the user a way to condense information without 
removing it.  By collapsing a number of symbols together, for example, the information 
about all the relationships to the rest of the software can still be retained.  This is useful 
when viewing software as a number of subsystems.  When examining the sub-system 
interfaces, the user can see how one particular sub-tree interacts with the rest of the 
software without being burdened by the details of the sub-tree. 
The views available in the analyze mode also provide insight into software 
metrics.  When selecting the analyze mode, the user has a choice to view the source graph 
in relation to complexity, lines, LOC, or callers.  In Figure 24, which shows the “main” 
function as the root, the symbols are color-coded to indicate whether they have a high, 
medium, or low value in relation to given complexity levels.  By having a visual 
indication of the metric level as the user examines the design structure, he is able to more 
quickly identify areas that require attention for inspection, redesign, and modification.  In 
this example, red indicates functions with the highest complexity and the least complex 
functions are green.  In Figure 25, which depicts the complexity thresholds setting, a user 
is able to change the threshold values to meet his organization’s design policy.   
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Figure 24.   Analyze Mode - Software Complexity Analysis. 
 
Figure 25.   Threshold Complexity Level Setting. 
3. Control Flow Analysis of the Source Code 
There may be times when it is important to understand the sequence and 
conditionality of the function calls and variables usage in the source code.  For this more 
detailed control flow analysis, Imagix 4D provides the control flow mode. 
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Figure 26.   Control Flow Analysis. 
For some symbols, their usage is the same in both the control flow mode and the 
standard graph.  In both, blue, square-shaped symbols are associated with functions; and 
the symbols for variables are green and have sloped sides.  The functions, however, are 
larger and contain additional information.  From Figure 26, which depicts the “main” 
function and its interaction with functions and variables, it is observed that the functions 
enclose source code snippets with blue and green rectangles along their right edge.  The 
snippets reflect the line of source code where the function call or variable usage occurs, 
the yellow text indicates that the source code was part of a decision, the white text is used 
for source code from a block of in-line code, and the blue and green rectangles along the 
right edge indicate whether a function is being called or a variable is being accessed.  By 
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studying the control flow graph, one is able to learn about the order and conditions under 
which functions are called and variables are set and read. 
D. CONCLUSION 
With the goal of constructing source code that is straightforward and 
understandable, an automated tool such as Imagix 4D can be a valuable aid to help each 
programmer of the project team have a thorough comprehension of the software, thereby 
providing source code that is less complex, less error-prone, and easier to test.  
With a review of Imagix 4D’s capabilities completed, we will now apply its 
functionality to analyze the source code of the Linux, OpenBSD, and Talisker operating 
systems.  In this context, we plan to observe the differences in complexity demonstrated 





















































VI. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS OF LINUX, OPENBSD, AND 
TALISKER 
A. INTRODUCTION  
As this chapter will demonstrate, all three operational modes of the Imagix 4D 
tool (Browse, Explore, and Analyze) were used to study many different attributes of the 
Linux, OpenBSD, and Talisker operating systems.  However, before discussing the basis 
of the analysis (the source code used, the data gathered using the Imagix 4D tool, and the 
final results from the comparative analysis) a brief background history of each operating 
system will be given to provide an overview of each system’s origin, design goals or 
development process, and release distribution history.  The experiment that will follow 
examines each operating system, its kernel, and its schedule module using the tool’s 
various views, displays, and reports.  After gathering enough data for analysis, the design 
and implementation of the three operating systems will then be compared in the context 
of the design principles previously presented, including hierarchical structuring, modular 
design, information hiding, the McCabe Cyclomatic Complexity, and the number–of-
lines-of-code complexity metric.     
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Linux 
Linux was initially developed in 1991 as an operating system for IBM-compatible 
personal computers [BOV01].  Linus Torvalds, the creator of the operating system and 
current owner of the Linux registered trademark, keeps the operating system up-to-date 
with various hardware developments and coordinates the activity of hundreds of other 
Linux developers around the world.   As a result of this cooperation, developers have 
worked to make Linux available on other architectures, including Alpha, SPARC, 
Motorola MC680x0, PowerPC, and IBM System/390.  An appealing benefit of Linux is 
the fact that it is an open source system.  Under the GNU Public License, the source code 
is open and available for anyone to study.  If the Linux kernel or its core utilities are 
modified or redistributed, the license stipulates that these changes must be released as 
open source.  This has spawned many different activities in the operating system’s 
continuous evolution.   
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One example of an activity shared by volunteer, non-commercial developers is the 
design and implementation of the Linux kernel source code, which is currently 
maintained at www.kernel.org.  This web site and dozens of others are devoted to 
facilitating the simultaneous development of Linux.  Of the versions presently available, 
each has two separate code trees to differentiate between a stable version and a 
development version.  A simple numbering scheme is used to distinguish these kernel 
versions.  The first number is the version number, the second number denotes whether it 
is a stable version (even) or development version (odd), and the third is the release 
number [BOV01].  For example, Linux 2.4.17, which will be used in the complexity 
analysis later in this chapter, is interpreted as Linux Version 2 - Stable Kernel 4 - Release 
17.     
A distribution of Linux provides a stable kernel version along with other standard 
utilities that the distribution creator feels is appropriate.  Caldera, Debian, Slackware, 
TurboLinux, Red Hat, and SuSE are all examples of these distributions.  Others include 
Corel, Mandrake, and variations on existing distributions such as Trustix, which is a pre- 
hardened version of Red Hat.  
2. OpenBSD 
In 1976, the Computer Science Research Group (CSRG) of the University of 
California in Berkley, CA started releasing an open source operating system called the 
Berkley Software Distribution or BSD [STA98].  This operating system was an open 
source derivative of AT&T’s Research UNIX operating system, which is also the 
ancestor of the modern UNIX System V.  Using the work initiated by CSRG, other 
projects like NetBSD and FreeBSD were created later with particular design goals 
specified.  This caused the code base of the original version diverge to the point that the 
code of the multiple systems could no longer be merged.  In 1996, another project called 
OpenBSD split off from NetBSD, making it the third version of BSD available today 
[STA98].   
From a development standpoint, no one person or corporation owns BSD.  It is 
created and distributed by a community of highly technical and committed contributors 
from all over the world.  The BSD kernels are developed and updated following the open 
source development model [LEH99].  Each project maintains a publicly accessible source 
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tree under the Current Versions System (CVS), which contains all source files for the 
project, including documentation and other incidental files.  CVS allows users to check 
out and extract copies of any desired version of the system available.  The developers 
who contribute to the improvements of the OpenBSD project are divided into two 
categories, the contributors and the committers [LEH99]. 
Contributors write code or documentation.  They are not permitted to commit or 
add code directly to the source tree.  In order for their code to be included in the system, 
it must be reviewed and checked by a registered developer, known as a committer.  
Committers are developers with write access to the source tree.  In order to 
become a committer, an individual must show ability in the area in which he is active.  It 
is at the individual committer's discretion whether he should consult with other 
committers prior to adding changes to the source tree.   
Just like Linux, OpenBSD has a nomenclature for distinguishing the different 
versions of the operating system in the source tree.  For instance, all new developments 
of the system are submitted into a branch called CURRENT.  Unlike Linux, OpenBSD 
does not assign a number to this version (i.e., "OpenBSD-CURRENT").  At regular 
intervals, between two and four times a year, this branch of the OpenBSD project 
provides a new RELEASE version of the system, which is available on CD-ROM and via 
free download from mirrored ftp sites.  The version that is released is intended for end 
users and is the normal stable version of the operating system.  The version that will be 
used in the complexity analysis is “OpenBSD 2.9-RELEASE.”  As flaws are found in a 
RELEASE version, they are repaired and then added to the CVS tree.  
In contrast to the numerous Linux distributions, there are only three open source 
BSDs: FreeBSD, NetBSD, and OpenBSD.  Of these three, the design goals of OpenBSD 
are security and code purity.  The project team meets these goals by using a combination 
of open source sharing and rigorous code reviews.  Their objective is  to create a system 
that is demonstrably correct, making it the choice of security-conscious organizations 





The first device using Windows CE was the handheld PC 1.0, which was shipped 
in 1996 with the Windows CE 1.0 version (HAL01).  Afterwards, new releases of the 
Windows CE operating system were given codenames based on tree types, including 
Alder (Windows CE versions 2.0/2.1), Birch (Windows CE Versions 2.11/2.12), and 
Cedar (Windows CE 3.0).  However, the third generation of Windows CE has since 
separated from this tradition given the name Talisker, presumably after a Scotch whisky.     
At the time of Version 1.0, no tools were publicly available to allow developers to 
build their own custom-embedded devices using Windows CE.  However, Microsoft did 
ship a set of tools to the original equipment manufacturers (OEM) of hardware like Casio 
and Compaq, who were currently building the Handheld PC 1.0.  These tools were 
known as the OEM Adaptation Kit, or “OAK.”  The tools developed to help build the 
second generation of Windows CE, Versions 2.0-3.0, were named after the tools that 
could cut down a respective type of tree.  For example, Axe was used for Adler, Buzzsaw 
for Birch, and Chainsaw for Cedar.  But with the third generation, the operating systems 
and tools were no longer given separate names; hence, the combination is called Talisker.  
Windows CE is an operating system built from scratch and specifically designed 
for the needs of embedded systems [HAL01].  Contrary to popular belief, it is not based 
on the Windows NT design nor is it compatible with NT applications.  From the outset, 
the project had a number of design goals, including (1) building an OS suitable for small 
systems, (2) supporting a broad range of hardware, (3) using standard APIs, 
programming models, and tools, (4) making the OS componentized and ROM-able to 
allow for the best fit of memory and features, (5) enabling compelling products with 
built-in features like communications, user interface, database, and file systems, (6) real-
time support, and (7) enabling battery-powered products by including unobtrusive power 
management.   
Componentization, one of the core design goals of the Windows CE operating 
system, enables an embedded developer to choose the blocks or components of Windows 
CE that are appropriate for the device he is building [HAL01].  This approach makes it 
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possible to build a variety of devices using the Windows CE operating system, including 
industrial control systems, handheld PCs, and Pocket PCs.  Since the Windows CE 3.0 
operating system contains approximately 220 modules, the developer can use the 
Platform Builder 3.0 tool to configure a custom image of Windows CE 3.0 by selecting 
the components that are necessary for the device [HAL01].  Talisker developers will use 
the same approach using the updated Platform Builder 4.0.  
With a review of system background completed, we can now proceed with the 
comparative analysis of the operating systems using an automated tool.  
C. BASIS FOR ANALYSIS  
Using Imagix 4D, six different “projects” to browse, explore, and analyze were 
created for the experiment, including (1) Linux_OS_X86, (2) OpenBSD_OS_X86, (3) 
Talisker_OS_X86, (4) Linux_Kernel_X86, (5) OpenBSD_Kernel_X86, and (6) 
Talisker_Kernel_X86.  In the experiment conducted using these six projects, three design 
principles (hierarchical structuring, modularity, and information hiding) and two 
complexity measures (cyclomatic complexity and number-of-lines-of-code) were used as 
a basis for comparison.  This section will present a brief overview of what these 
principles and measures represent, their importance to proper software design, and how 
they were used in the comparative analysis experiment.     
1. Hierarchical Structuring 
Recall from earlier discussion that to define a hierarchical structure, a partial 
ordering relation such as “uses” or “depends on” needs to be defined between the 
modules or programs.  If the modules are assembled on different levels, a partial ordering 
can be introduced giving three additional benefits to the system: (1) parts of the system 
are simplified because they use the services of the lower levels, (2) if the upper levels 
were cut off, the remaining lower levels are still considered as a usable and useful 
product, and (3) common pitfalls of circular dependency such as live lock and deadlock 
are avoided.   
If the system were designed in such a way that the low level modules made use of 
the high level modules, no hierarchical structure would exist, making it very difficult to 
remove portions of the system and still have it be usable and useful.  Recall from the 
78 
Multics experience that in their attempt to rid the system of dependency loops, they 
decided to use levels of abstraction in their security kernel design as a means of reducing 
complexity and providing precise and understandable specifications.  By making lower 
layers unaware of higher abstractions, the Multics kernel designers were able to reduce 
the total amount of interactions in the system and thereby reduce the overall complexity.  
In addition, these levels of abstraction simplified the correctness argument and kernel 
debugging since each layer could be tested in isolation from all higher layers. 
Using the information gathered in its database after parsing the operating system 
source code, Imagix 4D can present 3-D graphical layouts that show a system’s 
hierarchical structuring and dependencies.  Using the tool’s different graphical layout 
modes, we are able to see if the source code of each operating system is designed and 
written in a manner that exhibits partial ordering.   
2. Modular Programming 
A module that has been well designed encapsulates a function or database and it is 
always called upon by other modules for access to the module’s services.  In a sense, the 
module is a “database” containing entity that holds different types of information.  To 
access this database, three types of interfaces can be defined: those that initialize the data, 
those that modify the data, and those that list the data.   
When a software engineer decides to build a new system using modularity, the 
designer needs to define the problem, define the databases, and then decompose these 
into modules.  This decomposition supports the understanding, analysis, and maintenance 
of the interfaces and can provide a basis for least privilege.  As an added benefit, modular 
programming uses coding techniques that allow modules to be written with little to no 
knowledge of the code in other modules; this allows the modules to be replaced or 
reassembled without having any effect on the system as a whole.  Recall that the other 
benefits of modular design include improved development time, product flexibility (i.e., 
if the interface is stable, the module can undergo drastic internal changes without 
affecting the other modules), and comprehensibility (i.e., it should be possible for anyone 
to study the complete system one module at a time).   
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Using the information gathered in its database, Imagix 4D can present file 
summary and function information reports that provide module characteristics, including 
the total number of modules, the number of functions included in each module, and the 
number of other functions that call a particular function given by the “callers” metric.  
From the data gathered, some inferences can be made regarding modularity.  For 
instance, if an operating system uses a large number of modules, it may be inferred that 
the design properly supports the understanding, analysis, and maintenance of the 
interfaces.  However, if a given module handles a plethora of different functions and 
manages many databases, its modularity is questionable.  In addition, the “callers” metric 
may reveal how well this given module’s interface is defined and used.   If the average 
number of callers per function is high, then other modules call upon the encapsulated 
functions of a given module through a well-defined interface.  If this average is low, then 
their exists a wide number of functions that are called rarely, which may demonstrate an 
interface that is broad and not well-defined.  
3. Information Hiding 
A protected subsystem, as defined in earlier discussion, is a collection of 
procedures and data objects that is encapsulated in a domain of its own.  This 
encapsulation allows the data structure of the protected object to be interpretively 
accessed; for example, it does not allow its internal organization to be accessible except 
by the internal procedures of the protected subsystem, which may be called only through 
specifically designated, domain entry points.   
Information hiding is such a design approach where the software is decomposed 
into modules that hide design decisions.  This helps shift attention away from the code 
used to implement the module and concentrate more on the signature or interface of the 
module.  Therefore, the member variables used by each module should be private.  To 
manipulate this private data, a simple, high-level, well-defined interface should be 
provided in the design to hide the implementation details.  For instance, if a program 
tracks vehicle velocity, the module that encapsulates this data should include “set 
velocity” and “get velocity” functions rather than permitting an interface that directly 
manipulates the variable.  In comparison, the use of global variables in a software design 
goes against the principle of information hiding.   
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From its database, Imagix 4D can present file summary reports that show the total 
number of variables included in each source file as well as the total number of global 
variables included in the header files.  Using the explore features of Imagix 4D, all of the 
variables in the source code can be queried to see which of these are also considered to be 
global by the automated tool.  A variable is categorized as global if it is manipulated by 
more than one module.       
4. McCabe Cyclomatic Complexity 
The McCabe Cyclomatic Complexity metric, which measures the amount of 
decision logic in a source code function, is independent of text formatting and nearly 
independent of programming language.  When considering the dynamic behavior of the 
system, there is no practical way to check all of the possible control paths to verify 
whether they produce correct results that are error-free.  Since complexity is a common 
source of error in software, McCabe decided to use his complexity metric to directly 
allocate testing effort.  Since the cyclomatic complexity is the minimum number of paths 
that can, in linear combination, generate all possible paths through the module, one only 
requires this complexity number to cover all of the relevant edges of each software 
module giving a strong indicator of its testability, as well as its understandability and 
receptiveness to modification.  This resulting measure can be used in development, 
maintenance, and reengineering situations to develop estimates of risk, cost, or program 
stability.   
For our analysis, recall McCabe’s threshold points for the cyclomatic complexity 
as it pertains to software design.  A value of less than 10 is ideal for good design; a value 
greater than 10 but less than 15 requires that the designers know what behavior is desired, 
and that they know how to achieve this mapping of specifications to the code 
implementation properly.  However, a value greater than 15 should only be attempted by 
an experienced and knowledgeable staff that is using formal design methods, a modern 
programming language, structured programming, code walkthroughs, and a 
comprehensive test plan.  From the Imagix 4D database, function information reports can 
generate the cyclomatic complexity numbers for functions included in each module.  
These values can be compared against McCabe’s threshold points to see the relative 
complexity of each operating system. 
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5. Number-of-Lines-of-Code  
Although the McCabe Cyclomatic Complexity metric is a more accurate measure 
of the complexity exhibited by a module’s decision logic, Imagix 4D also includes other 
software metrics such as the total lines of code, which are included as metric data in the 
file summary and function information reports.  From this archaic measure, the average 
number of lines per function can be calculated giving a rough estimate of the relative 
complexity of the operating system.  For instance, if a function exceeds a full page or 60 
lines of code, it may be considered to be too complex. 
D. SOURCE CODE FILES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS 
The source trees as illustrated in these tables represent the actual amount of 
operating system source code loaded into the automated tool and parsed into the Imagix 
4D database.  Once this information is available to the tool, the source code can be 
browsed, explored, and analyzed.    
1. Operating System Source Code 
The source code directories for each operating system are shown in Tables 1, 2, 
and 3.  Some source code files related to networking, non-X86 architectures, and drivers 
as well as any documentation directories were removed from the Linux, OpenBSD, and 
Talisker projects to focus the study on the core i386 architecture, including the file 
system, process scheduling, management of input/output (I/O) devices, memory 
management, and the necessary library files.      
From the directories shown, a few differences in the design of each operating 
system can be seen.  For instance, the OpenBSD system has a much larger number of 
directories that are more specific to a set of functionality (i.e., different file system 
directories), while Talisker has a broader categorization of its source code.  This 
difference may reflect OpenBSD’s design goal to build an operating system that is highly 
modular.   
All three operating systems show many similarities.  For example, each system 
has directories for file system management.  Library and header files are in wide use 
since all three operating systems are written in C.  Each system appears to employ the 
kernel concept in its system architecture.  Besides the graphics, window manager, and 
event manager, the one other difference in Talisker is the absence of a memory 
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management directory.  Rather than keeping it separate, Talisker instead includes this 
source inside its new kernel (nk) directory.  As we will see later in our analysis, the 
designers of Talisker decided to include much of the operating system, including the 
large GWE source, in the kernel apparently for performance reasons.   
asm fs i386 init ipc
kernel lib linux mm  
 
Table 1.   Linux 2.4.17 Source Directories – X86 Architecture. 
adofs i386 isofs kern lib
misfs msdosfs nfs stand sys
ufs uvm vm xfs  
Table 2.   OpenBSD 2.9 Source Directories – X86 Architecture. 
core device fsdmgr gwe nk
 
Table 3.   Talisker Source Directories – X86 Architecture. 
2. Kernel Source Code 
The kernel source code modules for the Linux operating system are listed in 
Tables 4 and 5.  The reason for this separation of the kernel source is in accordance with 
the way Linux handles portability and reusability of their code.  Table 4 lists the modules 
that are applicable to all platform architectures, while the modules in Table 5 are specific 
to the X86 Intel architecture.  The kernel source code files for OpenBSD in Table 6 and 
Talisker in Table 7 also lists the modules that were loaded into the Imagix 4D database. 
With the total number of modules totaling 60 in Linux and OpenBSD at 82, one 
could infer from the names of the modules that both of these systems may use some form 
of modular programming in their kernel designs.  Talisker, in comparison, with only 40 
modules in its kernel may fail to demonstrate whether the design employs a modular 
approach or not.  As previously discussed in the basis of the analysis, a module should 
encapsulate one database, whether real or abstract, that handles a specific portion of the 
problem decomposed and shared by several specific modules.    
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asm dma.c kmod.c ptrace.c sysctl.c
kernel exec_domain.c ksyms.c resource.c time.c
linux exit.c module.c sched.c timer.c
acct.c fork.c panic.c signal.c uid16.c
capability.c info.c pm.c softirq.c user.c
context.c itimer.c printk.c sys.c  
Table 4.   Linux Kernel Source Files – All Platforms. 
acpitable.c i8259.c mpparse.c pci-visws.c sys_i386.c
apic.c init_task.c msr.c process.c time.c
apm.c io_apic.c mtrr.c ptrace.c traps.c
bluesmoke.c ioport.c nmi.c semaphore.c visws_apic.c
cpuid.c irq.c pci-dma.c setup.c vm86.c
dmi_scan.c ldt.c pci-i386.c signal.c
i386_ksyms.c mca.c pci-irq.c smp.c
i387c microcode.c pci-pc.c smpboot.c  
Table 5.   Linux Kernel Source Files – X86 Architecture. 
CVS kern_fork.c kern_timeout.c syscalls.c sysctl.c
sys kern_fthread.c kern_xxx.c sysv_ipc.c uipc_syscalls.c
exec_aout.c kern_kthread.c kgdb_stub.c sysv_msg.c uipc_userreq.c
exec_conf.c kern_ktrace.c subr_autoconf.c sysv_sem.c vfs_bio.c
exec_ecoff.c kern_lkm.c subr_disk.c sysv_shm.c vfs_cache.c
exec_elf.c kern_lock.c subr_extent.c tty.c vfs_cluster.c
exec_elf64.c kern_malloc.c subr_log.c tty_conf.c vfs_conf.c
exec_script.c kern_ntptime.c subr_pool.c tty_pty.c vfs_default.c
exec_subr.c kern_physio.c subr_prf.c tty_subr.c vfs_init.c
init_main.c kern_proc.c subr_prof.c tty_tb.c vfs_lockf.c
init_sysent.c kern_prot.c subr_rmap.c tty_tty.c vfs_lookup.c
kern_acct.c kern_resource.c subr_userconf.c uipc_domain vfs_subr.c
kern_clock.c kern_sig.c subr_xxx.c uipc_mbuf.c vfs_sync.c
kern_descrip.c kern_subr.c sys_generic.c uipc_mbuf2.c vfs_syscalls.c
kern_event.c kern_synch.c sys_pipe.c uipc_proto.c vfs_vnops.c
kern_exec.c kern_sysctl.c sys_process.c uipc_socket.c vnode_if.c
kern_exit.c kern_time.c sys_socket.c uipc_socket2.c  
Table 6.   OpenBSD Kernel Source Files. 
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celog.c heap.c kdpacket.c mdx86.c profiler.c
compr2.c intrapi.c kdriver.c memtrk.c resource.c
dbg.c kdapi.c kdtrap.c objdisp.c schedule.c
dbgasync.c kdbreak.c kdkernel.c odebug.c sprofile.c
debug.c kdctrl.c kmisc.c physmem.c strings.c
exdsptch.c kddata.c kwin32.c ppfs.c stubs.c
exsup.c kdinit.c loader.c printf.c sysinit.c
fault.c kdmove.c mapfile.c profile.c virtmem.c  
Table 7.   Talisker Kernel Source Files. 
E. INFORMATION GATHERED FROM IMAGIX 4D 
1. Function Call Graphs 
Using the different graphical layout modes available with Imagix 4D, we are able 
to see if the source code of each operating system is designed and written in a manner 
that exhibits partial ordering.  To observe whether this property is satisfied, Imagix 4D 
includes in all of its operating modes the compact graph layout option to help visualize 
the layering of the system design.  
Under the compact layout, all of functions at the top-most layer are considered the 
root function symbols, which we will call “Layer 1.”  In the operating system 
architecture, “Layer 1” is the application-programming interface (API).  The next level or 
“Layer 2” contains all of the function symbols directly related to the root function 
symbols in “Layer 1.”  The third level (Layer 3) contains all of the functions that are 
directly related to the second level (Layer 2) but not the initial root level (Layer 1), and so 
on.  Hence, the functions in “Layer 1” call the functions in “Layer 2,” which in turn call 
the functions in “Layer 3,” and so on.  This direct relationship is a “depends on” relation 
between the software layers.  However, the “depends on” arrows can point in either 
direction for function calls or reads.  Recall that if the operating system source code is 
designed and written in a manner that exhibits partial ordering, then there should be no 
arrows in the up direction between the different software layers. 
The Linux, OpenBSD, and Talisker operating systems, kernels, and schedule 
modules were viewed using the compact layout mode.  In the operating system and 
kernel projects, the following procedure was used to see whether any “depends on” 
arrows were pointing up toward higher layers in the hierarchy: 
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- In “Browse” mode, select the function checkbox in the bottom left hand corner 
of the “Graph” window.  (We only wish to view the operating system functions.) 
- Shift to the “Explore” mode and select “Restore All” from the “Filter” pull-
down menu.  (This will display all of the operating system’s function symbols.) 
- Select “Root Symbols” from the “Select” pull-down menu.  (This will highlight 
Layer 1 in the graph.) 
- Select “Group Selected…” from the “Group” pull-down menu and enter “Layer 
1” for the group name.  (Grouping the functions of Layer 1 into one graph 
symbol.) 
- Now select “Step Down” from the “Traverse” pull-down menu.  (Proceeds to the 
next layer in the hierarchy by highlighting all of the second layer, function 
symbols). 
- Before grouping “Layer 2,” de-select the “Layer 1” symbol by clicking on its 
name in the “List” window.  (This prevents the layers from becoming grouped 
rather than keeping them separate.) 
- Continue this process until all of the layers are grouped. 
- View the new graph in 2-D, horizontal, normal mode by de-selecting the “3-D,” 
“Compact,” and “Vertical” checkboxes in the bottom of the “Graph” window.  
(From this new presentation, we can now see what layers make calls in the 
upward direction.) 
In the screen shots that follow, the kernel function hierarchies that were used at 
the start of this process are presented for illustration.  The operating system graphs are 
not included since they replicate the kernel graphs with detail that is hard to display.  The 
previous procedure was applied to all six of the operating system and kernel graphs to see 
if any calls are in fact made in the up direction.  These six layering screen shots follow 
the six kernel and schedule module function hierarchy graphs.   
a. Kernel Function Hierarchies 
Figures 27, 28, and 29, which illustrate the Linux, OpenBSD, and Talisker 
kernels respectively, are examples of compact graph layouts.   
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Figure 29.   Talisker Kernel – Function Hierarchy (Compact View). 
b. Schedule Module Function Hierarchies 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to point out the naming convention for 
the scheduling source code used by each operating system.  In Linux and Talisker, the 
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source code files are called “sched.c” and “schedule.c,” respectively.  In contrast, 
OpenBSD uses “kern_synch.c” as the name of its scheduling module. 
The schedule module hierarchies are shown to see the layout of the Linux, 
OpenBSD, and Talisker schedule source files.  The functions included in each schedule 
module were then studied to determine whether any of these should not be included in the 
module.  Recall from the modularity discussion that if a given module handles a plethora 
of different functions and manages many databases, its modularity is questionable.  The 
process of finding upward “depends on” arrows does not apply to the schedule module 
functions.  Only a module’s interface with the rest of the operating system is considered 
part of the hierarchical structuring.               
In Figure 30, the Linux schedule module is shown in the compact layout 
with a total of five levels being visible in the hierarchy.  Figure 31, which illustrates the 
synchronization module used in OpenBSD, and Figure 32, which shows the Talisker 
version of the scheduling module, also provide the same information as observed in 
Linux, except OpenBSD and Talisker both show four levels.   
Other observations can be made about the number of functions in each 
schedule module regarding modularity.  For instance, Linux and OpenBSD both have 17 
functions that are included inside each module.  From the names of the functions in 
Linux, such as “add_to_runqueue,” “goodness,” and “schedule,” it can be concluded that 
these handle process scheduling.  With function names like “preempt,” “roundrobin,” and 
“schedcpu,” the same can conclusions can be drawn for the OpenBSD module.  Talisker, 
however, with over 143 different functions contained within its “schedule.c” module, 
appears to have more than just functions related to scheduling.  For instance, several 
other functions handled in separate modules in Linux and OpenBSD are shown to be 
included in Talisker’s schedule module, including semaphore and mutual exclusion 
functions, memory paging functions, kernel and user time functions, and thread creation 
(forking) functions.  Since the module handles a plethora of different functions and 
manages many databases, its modularity is questionable.   
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Figure 30.   Linux Scheduling – Function Hierarchy (Compact View). 
 
Figure 31.   OpenBSD Scheduling – Function Hierarchy (Compact View). 
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Figure 32.   Talisker Scheduling – Function Hierarchy (Compact View). 
c. Operating System Layering 
The results from the procedure to find upward “depends on” arrows in the 
operating system layers are shown in the next three screen shots.  In Figure 33, Linux 
shows eight layers in its hierarchical structuring.  The red arrows represent the “calls” 
relations while the light purple arrows represent the “reads” relations.  From the 
illustration, many “depends on” arrows are pointing in upward direction.  This means that 
the lower layers are making “calls” to higher layers, which is not in agreement with 
partial ordering.  OpenBSD, in Figure 34 with eight layers, and Talisker, in Figure 35 
with nine layers, also exhibit a breakdown in partial ordering with dependencies in the 
upward direction.  In the analysis section, the number of layers and number of upward 
dependencies will be used to determine which operating system most closely meets the 
criteria for partial ordering.   
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Figure 33.   Linux Operating System Layering. 
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Figure 34.   OpenBSD Operating System Layering. 
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Figure 35.   Talisker Operating System Layering. 
d. Kernel Layering 
The following three screen shots are the results from the procedure to find 
upward “depends on” arrows in the kernel layers.  Linux, in Figure 36, shows six layers, 
OpenBSD, in Figure 37, has five layers, and Talisker, shown in Figure 38, displays seven 
layers in their kernel hierarchies.  As illustrated in the operating system graphs, many 
“depends on” arrows are pointing in upward direction.  The analysis of this data will be 
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presented in the next section.  From visual observation, however, it appears that 
OpenBSD has fewer circular dependencies with Linux next in line followed by Talisker.   
 
Figure 36.   Linux Kernel Layering. 
 
Figure 37.   OpenBSD Kernel Layering. 
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Figure 38.   Talisker Kernel Layering. 
2. File Summary Reports 
File summary reports provide an overview of the files in the project.  By 
tabulating these reports by type (i.e., source and header files) and by directory location, 
information about lines of code, lines of comments, number of functions, and the number 
of variables are listed.  These statistics are useful in helping software designers make 
improvements in the implementation of their particular software package.  In our 
comparative analysis, where software design principles are being considered, the 
information provided in these reports can help determine which system better satisfies 
modularity and information hiding. 
During our data gathering process using Imagix 4D, file summary reports were 
generated for each of the six projects (viz, the three operating systems and the three 
kernels).  Since the file summary report is not specific to each module, information about 
the three different kernel schedule modules had to be gathered from other sources, 
primarily the function information reports, which will be discussed in the next subsection.  
The following screen shots reflect a summary of the six different reports that were 
gathered for our analysis. 
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a. Operating System Files 
Figures 39, 40, and 41 show the top portion of the file summary report 
generated for the respective Linux, OpenBSD, and Talisker operating systems.   
 
Figure 39.   Linux Operating System – File Summary Report. 
 
Figure 40.   OpenBSD Operating System – File Summary Report. 
 






b. Kernel Files  
Summary information reports on all the kernel modules for the Linux, 
OpenBSD, and Talisker operating systems are shown in Figures 42, 43, and 44, 
respectively.  The parts of the reports that were used to create the summaries in the 
analysis section included “Total Files,” “Total KLines,” “Members Funcs”, and 
“Members Vars”.  These measures were extracted from the source file lines only.    
 
Figure 42.   Linux Kernel – File Summary Report. 
 
Figure 43.   OpenBSD Kernel – File Summary Report. 
 
Figure 44.   Talisker Kernel – File Summary Report. 
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3. Function Information Reports 
Imagix 4D provides another type of report that lists the functions in a project, 
showing complexity, lines of code inside the function, total lines of code, number of 
callers, and the file location.  The information in this report can be sorted in decreasing 
order using any one of these five function characteristics.  Software designers can use 
these statistics to study the complexity of their source code during the implementation 
and maintenance phases of an operating system lifecycle.  In our comparative analysis, 
the information provided in these reports can help determine which operating system is 
more complex in its design, and how the average number of callers per function affects 
our modularity comparison.  
The data gathered for our study and analysis include the generation of nine 
different function information reports.  In each report, the functions were listed in order 
of complexity starting from the highest measure.  The other sorting options were not 
viewed as valuable since the reports were printed to a text file and imported into 
corresponding spreadsheets, where sorting could be controlled at a higher level beyond 
the capabilities of Imagix 4D.  Using the spreadsheet application, a complexity 
distribution related to McCabe’s threshold values for complexity (i.e., less than or equal 
to 10 and greater than 10) can be calculated using the spreadsheet’s numbering scheme.  
The number of functions that have callers greater than zero can also be found by sorting 
these numbers in decreasing order.  Taking the total number of callers and dividing by the 
total number of called functions can provide an average for comparison value.  The first 
three function information reports that were generated using this process included the 
Linux, OpenBSD, and Talisker operating systems.  The three respective operating system 
kernels followed, but the three scheduling module reports due to its manageable size did 
not require importation into corresponding spreadsheets.  From the analysis that will 
follow in the next section, the complexity distribution for each of these sets of three will 
help determine which system is more complex.  However, the “number of callers” data 
will only be shown in the analysis of the schedule modules to support an argument 
regarding modularity.   The following nine screen shots reflect a summary of the nine 
different reports that were gathered for our analysis.   
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a. Operating System Functions  
As stated previously, the function information reports that are shown in 
Figures 45, 46, and 47 give the first 20 functions of the Linux, OpenBSD, and Talisker 
operating systems respectively.   
 
Figure 45.   Linux OS – Function Information Sorted By Complexity. 
 
Figure 46.   OpenBSD OS – Function Information Sorted By Complexity. 
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Figure 47.   Talisker OS – Function Information Sorted By Complexity. 
From these three function information reports, one can conclude that 
OpenBSD’s complexity is far above the McCabe threshold values with measures in the 
hundreds.  In comparison, Talisker shown in Figure 47 appears to have a better handle on 
complexity, although it surpasses the threshold McCabe considers un-testable and high 
risk.  Linux falls somewhere in between of these two.  An analysis of the data gathered 
will be presented in the next section. 
b. Kernel Functions 
After inspection of Figures 48, 49, and 50 of the Linux, OpenBSD, and 
Talisker kernels respectively, all three appear to have nearly the same level of complexity 
at first glance.  If one was to order these from best to worst, it appears that Linux would 
be first, followed by Talisker, and then OpenBSD.  Trying to figure out which system is 
more complex using only the function reports is difficult.  As mentioned earlier, this data 
needs to be imported into a spreadsheet and studied further.  The results of this procedure 
will be referenced in the summary tables included in the analysis section.  The parts of 
the reports that were used to create the summaries included the “Cmplx” values for 
complexity.  In the schedule module analysis, however, the “Lines” and “Callers” metrics 
were included in the summaries to aid in the modularity analysis.   
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Figure 48.   Linux Kernel – Function Information Sorted By Complexity. 
 
Figure 49.   OpenBSD Kernel – Function Information Sorted By Complexity. 
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Figure 50.   Talisker Kernel – Function Information Sorted By Complexity. 
c. Schedule Module Functions 
The Linux, OpenBSD, and Talisker function reports for each schedule 
module are displayed in Figures 51, 52, and 53, respectively.  As stated earlier, the 
“Cmplx,” “Lines,” and “Callers” data was included in the summary tables created and 
presented in the analysis section. 
 
Figure 51.   Linux Kernel Schedule Module – Function Information Report. 
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Figure 52.   OpenBSD Schedule Module – Function Information Report. 
 
Figure 53.   Talisker Kernel Schedule Module – Function Information Report. 
From these function reports, Talisker in Figure 53 is the most complex 
regarding the cyclomatic complexity and lines of code; in addition, it has the most 
number of functions included inside its schedule module equaling 143.  As will be shown 
in the analysis section, the average number of callers per function result will support the 
argument that Talisker’s schedule module interface is not well defined.  In comparison, 
Linux and OpenBSD have the same number of functions, but Linux is the least complex 
regarding cyclomatic complexity and lines of code.  From a brief glance at the number of 
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callers, OpenBSD has a higher number of callers than Linux.  The actual numbers will be 
reviewed in the analysis regarding modularity.   
4. Global Variable Graphs 
In this portion of the data gathering process of the experiment, the “Explore” 
mode features of the Imagix 4D tool were used to help find all of the global variables in 
the source code found in each of the six projects as well as the three schedule modules.   
Recall that the definition of a global variable, as observed from using Imagix 4D, is any 
variable that is shared by two or more modules (source files) in the system.  If a global 
variable exists between modules, then the principle of information hiding is no longer 
valid in the design, thereby affecting its modularity.  To assist those designing, 
implementing, and maintaining an operating system over its lifecycle, the Imagix 4D tool 
can help determine if global variables are ever introduced.   
The process that was used to find the global variables is straightforward.  For 
instance, while in the “Browse” mode in one of the six Imagix 4D projects, the 
“Variables” checkbox in the bottom left hand corner of the graph window should be the 
only one selected.  Then one needs to proceed to the “Explore” mode and select from the 
“Filter” pull-down menu the “Restore All” selection, which displays all of the variables 
stored in the database.  The Graph window will show a forest of green variable symbols, 
and the List window will correspond to each variable listing its name and location.  The 
“All” function from the “Select” pull-down menu then needs to be selected followed by 
the “Find” function found in the same pull-down menu.  This command will present a 
“Find” pop-up window where a type “Program Element” and subtype “Variable” need to 
be selected from the appropriate scroll-selection boxes.  The final step involves clicking 
on the “Options” button of this pop-up window, which displays another window with 
different find query options.  From the “Scope” option, select “Global” from the list of 
choices and then click on the “OK” button followed by the “Find” button.  In the Graph 
and List windows, only the global variables will be highlighted as a result of this 
operation.  From the List window, the total number of global variables can be summed. 
The following six screen shots show the results of this process for each of the 
three kernel projects and the three schedule modules.  The three operating systems were 
also considered in this experiment, but the screen shots were not included due to the 
106
problem of properly viewing such a large number of variables.  For the schedule 
modules, the only change in procedure is to select the corresponding schedule module 
(i.e., “sched.c” for Linux, “kern_synch.c” for OpenBSD, and “schedule.c” for Talisker) 
from the “File Browser” while either in the “Browse” or “Explore” modes of Imagix 4D 
rather than restoring all the variables.  The analysis section that follows will summarize 
the information gathered for the operating systems, the kernels, and the schedule 
modules.                  
a. Kernel Global Variables 
 




Figure 55.   OpenBSD Kernel – Global Variables. 
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Figure 56.   Talisker Kernel – Global Variables.  
From the inspection of Figure 54, which shows the global variables of the 
Linux kernel highlighted in the List window and the Graph window, it looks visually 
apparent that Linux as well as the OpenBSD and Talisker systems shown in Figures 55 






b. Schedule Module Global Variables 
The next three screen shots show all of the variables included in each of 
the three operating system’s schedule modules.  From these variables, the procedure 
discussed earlier was used to find all of the global variables.  For instance, the Linux 
schedule module, shown in Figure 57, has seven global variables out of its total of 46 
variables.   In comparison, OpenBSD as shown in Figure 58 only has five global 
variables among its list of 67.  Talisker, in Figure 59, has a total of 79 global variables 
out of 776.   
 
Figure 57.   Linux Kernel Schedule Module – Global Variables. 
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Figure 58.   OpenBSD Kernel Schedule Module – Global Variables. 
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Figure 59.   Talisker Kernel Schedule Module – Global Variables. 
The analysis section that follows will summarize the information gathered 
for the schedule module.  From these, we will determine which operating system has the 
scheduling module that best demonstrates information hiding. 
F. ANALYSIS OF DATA GATHERED 
1. Hierarchical Structuring 
From the procedure we established to find the upward dependencies in the six 
operating system and kernel layering graphs shown in the data gathering section, we are 
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able to more closely study the grouping of dependencies that go either in the up or down 
direction in the hierarchical structures.  If any dependencies are shown to exist in the 
upward direction, then we know that circular dependencies may exist between the layers 
with no partial ordering, thereby breaking down the hierarchical structure.  From the 
screen shots observed in the previous section, we know that none of the structures we 
analyzed uses complete partial ordering in its layered design.  Thus, we will use the 
numbers gathered from the previous graphs to determine which of the three operating 
systems and which of the three kernels best exhibits a properly layered system.  To 
determine the number of calls and reads in both the up and down directions in each of the 
graphs, the arrowheads were counted and summed.     
a. Operating System Layering 
The operating system summary shown in Table 8 illustrates that the 
OpenBSD operating system with 11 calls and 3 reads in the upward direction best 
supports the principle of hierarchical structuring.  With 20 calls and 5 reads in the up 
direction, Linux is the worst example of proper partial ordering.  Talisker, in comparison, 
has 13 calls and 4 reads in the up direction, thereby falling in between the two other 





Linux    8 6 / 6 20 / 5
OpenBSD    8 5 / 4 11 / 3





Table 8.   Operating System Layers and Dependencies. 
b. Kernel Layering 
Table 9 shows the kernel summary that was built from the data gathered in 
the previous section.  Using the results found, the OpenBSD kernel with 4 calls and 2 
reads in the upward direction again best supports the principle of hierarchical structuring.  
Talisker, however, with 10 calls and 4 reads in the up direction is the worst among the 
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three kernels of proper partial ordering.  In comparison, Linux with 7 calls and 0 reads in 





Linux    6 4 / 3 7 / 0
OpenBSD    5 3 / 1 4 / 2




Table 9.   Kernel Layers and Dependencies. 
2. Modularity 
From the data gathered in the previous section, some inferences can be made 
regarding modularity.  For instance, if an operating system uses a large number of 
modules, it may be inferred that the design properly supports the understanding, analysis, 
and maintenance of the interfaces.  However, if a given module handles a plethora of 
different functions and manages many databases, its modularity is questionable.   
The summaries for the operating system and kernel projects were constructed 
using the file summary report data, where the total number of modules and functions can 
be obtained from the source file listings.  Using these figures, an average number of 
functions per module were calculated to help compare the different operating systems and 
kernels.  The summary for the schedule module analysis was built using the function 
information reports, where the number of “callers” and number of functions can be 
extracted.  These together produced an average number of callers per function to help 
determine which module has the most well defined interface.      
a. Operating System Code 
From Table 10, which summarizes the operating system source code, it 
can be seen that the Talisker operating system exhibits 17 functions per module on 
average, while Linux has 10 functions per module and OpenBSD has 8 functions per 
module.  Recall that if a given module handles several different functions and manages 
many databases, its modularity is questionable.  This logic may be applied to our 
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statistical data.  Among the three operating systems in our analysis, if a higher average 
number of functions per module can be found, then the corresponding operating system’s 
modularity is debatable.  The contra-positive of this inference would state that an 
operating system supports modularity better if a lower average number can be found.  
Since Talisker has the highest average, its modularity is indeed questionable.  OpenBSD 
with the lowest average may be the best example of a modular design.  In comparison, 
Linux exhibits a low average number, but not as well as OpenBSD.      
Linux       
C Code
408 4015 10
OpenBSD    
C Code
467 3710 8





Modules Functions Avg No 
Func/Mod
 
Table 10.   Summary of Operating System Modules and Functions. 
b.  Kernel Code  
The kernel summary illustrated in Table 11 has the same conclusions as 
those found in the operating system’s logical analysis regarding modularity.   
Linux       
C Code
60 769 13
OpenBSD    
C Code
82 925 11
Talisker     
C/C++ Code
40 776 19
Kernel Modules Functions Avg No 
Func/Mod
 
Table 11.   Summary of Kernel Modules and Functions. 
OpenBSD with 11 functions per module on average is the lowest average 
of the three kernels.  Hence, OpenBSD best demonstrates modularity.  The Talisker 
kernel is the furthest from demonstrating proper modularity with an average of 19 
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functions per module.  In comparison, Linux falls in between these two but closer to 
OpenBSD with an average of 13 functions per module.   
c. Schedule Module Code  
In the analysis of the schedule module, the “callers” metric was used from 
the function information reports to reveal how well the module interfaces are defined and 
used.   If the average number of callers per function is high, then other modules call upon 
the encapsulated functions of a given module through a well-defined interface.  If this 
average is low, then their exists a wide number of functions that are called rarely, which 
may demonstrate an interface that is broad and not well-defined. 
Linux        
sched.c
17 11 30 3
OpenBSD    
kern_synch.c
17 16 126 8
Talisker     
schedule.c
143 141 262 2
Schedule 
Module





Table 12.   Summary of Schedule Module Functions and Callers. 
From the summary in Table 12 of the three schedule modules, the OpenBSD 
module, with an average of 8 calls per function (126 callers divided by 16 called 
functions out of 17), best meets this quality of a well-defined interface.  Linux is not too 
far behind with an average of 3 calls per function (30 callers divided by 11 called 
functions out of 17).  In comparison to these three, Talisker’s schedule module, with 2 
calls per function (262 callers divided by 141 called functions out of 143), has the lowest.  
This result infers that Talisker’s schedule interface is too broad and its modularity is 
questionable since it includes several different functions and manages many databases 
that are rarely called.  This makes writing the schedule module with little to no 
knowledge of the code in other modules difficult, and it does not allow the module to be 




3. Information Hiding 
From our previous basis discussion, information hiding helps shift attention away 
from the code used to implement the module and concentrate more on the signature or 
interface of the module.  Therefore, the member variables used by each module should be 
private, and a simple, high-level, well-defined interface should be the only mechanism 
that manipulates their values.  Global variables do not exhibit any of these properties 
since two or more modules share them in the system, degrading the modularity of the 
design.  The summaries that follow will help determine which of the operating systems, 
kernels, and schedule modules has the least percentage of global variables in each of their 
included sets of variables.  This will aid in determining the better design regarding 
information hiding and modularity.   
Variable data from the file summary reports along with the global variable search 
procedure explained in the last section were used to build the operating system and kernel 
summaries.  For the number of variables in the summary tables, the source amount was 
extracted from the “source file” portion of the file summary report, while the global 
headers value was taken from the “header file” category.  The globals in the source value 
was found using the search method using Imagix 4D’s graph and list windows.  The total 
number of variables, used in finding the percentage of global variables overall, was taken 
from the “total file” portion of the summary report.  The schedule module summaries 
only used the data directly found using the global search method.  
a. Operating System Global Variables 
The summary in Table 13 illustrates the results of the analysis performed 
on the three operating systems.   
Source Global Hdrs
Linux        21580 6980 1138 8118 8118/28560  (28%)
OpenBSD 21165 5129 1773 6902 6902/26294  (26%)
Talisker 5497 5907 450 6357 6357/11404  (56%)
%  Total Variables 
that are Global





Table 13.   Operating System Global Variable Summary. 
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In Linux, 1138 global variables out of 21580 were found in the source.  
This number summed with the 6980 global variables included in the header files yielded 
a total global variable percentage of 28 (8118 global variables divided by 28560 total 
variables) with respect to all of the variables listed in the Imagix 4D database for the 
Linux operating system.  With 1773 global variables out of 21165 found in the source 
summed with the 5129 global header variables, OpenBSD has the lowest percentage of 
26 (6902 global variables divided by 26294 total variables) with respect to the variables 
loaded in the database.  With respect to the total variable count in the Imagix 4D 
database, the Talisker operating system had a percentage of 56 (6357 global variables 
divided by 11404 total variables), which was found using summation of the 450 global 
variables out of 5497 found in the source plus the 5907 global header variables.  From 
these results, the principle of information hiding is best demonstrated by the OpenBSD 
operating system.  The kernel analysis will be presented next for comparison.   
b.  Kernel Global Variables 
Of the global variables found in the source using the Imagix 4D search 
method defined earlier in the data gathering section, 214 global variables out of 2880 
were found in the Linux kernel, 296 global variables out of 4923 were found in the 
OpenBSD kernel, and 369 global variables out of 4010 were found to exist in the Talisker 
kernel.  
Source Global Hdrs
Linux        2880 2112 214 2326 2326/4992  (47%)
OpenBSD 4923 2842 296 3138 3138/7765  (40%)
Talisker 4010 4765 369 5134 5134/8775  (59%)
%  Total Variables 
that are Global




Table 14.   Kernel Global Variable Summary. 
From the global variable summary presented in Table 14, it can be 
observed that the OpenBSD kernel has the fewest number of global variables with respect 
to the total number of variables loaded into the Imagix 4D database with a percentage of 
40 (3138 global variables divided by 7765 total variables), while the Talisker kernel has 
118
the highest number with a percentage of 59 (5134 global variables divided by 8775 total 
variables).  Linux falls in between of these two with a percentage of 47 (2326 global 
variables divided by 4992 total variables).  The ranking of the three kernels match that of 
the operating system analysis, with OpenBSD first, Linux second, and Talisker third.   
c. Schedule Module Global Variables 
In the schedule module analysis, the search method was the only approach 
available to count the total number of variables and global variables in the module source 
code.  As illustrated in Table 15, which shows the schedule module summary, the 
“sched.c” module in Linux has 7 global variables out of 46 (15 percent).  OpenBSD’s 
“kern_synch.c” file has the least amount with a percentage of seven (5 global variables 
divided by 67 total).  The “schedule.c” module in Talisker falls in between the previous 
two with 79 global variables out of 776 (10 percent).  Like the operating system and 
kernel analysis, OpenBSD’s schedule module best satisfies the information hiding 
principle, but Talisker is second with Linux being third.       
Linux       
sched.c     46 7 15%
OpenBSD  
kern_synch.c 67 5 7%
Talisker    
schedule.c 776 79 10%










Table 15.   Schedule Module Global Variable Summary. 
4. McCabe Cyclomatic Complexity Distribution 
From McCabe’s threshold points for the cyclomatic complexity as it pertains to 
software design, a value of less than 10 is ideal for good design, but a value greater than 
10 requires that the designers know what behavior is desired, and that they know how to 
achieve this mapping of specifications to the code implementation properly.   
In the operating system, kernel, and schedule module summaries that follow, 
function information reports were used to extract the cyclomatic complexity numbers for 
the functions included in each module.  Of the total number of functions loaded into the 
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Imagix 4D database, most of these had complexity data calculated and made available by 
the automated tool.  The others not considered did not fit McCabe’s profile of a function 
with entry and exit points and decision logic (i.e., macros or other types).   Of the data 
gathered, the cyclomatic complexity distributions for the operating systems, kernels, and 
schedule modules can be compared against McCabe’s threshold points as well as against 
each other to see which is the most and least complex.  Complexity values greater than 10 
are discussed in the analysis, while the greater than 15 values are merely illustrated for 
continuity. 
a. Operating System Complexity 
From the summary in Table 16, which illustrates the complexity 
distributions for the three different operating systems, Talisker is the least complex 
system with only 13 percent (141 functions out of 1067) of its functions having 
complexity values greater than 10.  The most complex is OpenBSD, with 720 of 3596 (20 
percent) of its functions having complexity amounts exceeding 10.  With 597 of 3973 (15 
percent) of its functions having complexity values greater than 10, Linux is in between 




Data Avail Value > 10 Value > 15
Linux 4015 3973 597          (15%)
336          
(8%)
OpenBSD   3710 3596 720          
(20%)
415         
(12%)
Talisker 1075 1067 141          
(13%)






Table 16.   Operating System Complexity Distribution. 
b. Kernel Complexity 
The complexity distribution summary for the three different kernels is 
shown in Table 17.  Like the operating system analysis, the OpenBSD kernel is the most 
complex of the three with 21 percent (195 functions out of 922) of its functions having 
complexity values greater than 10.  In comparison to the previous analysis, the least 
complex is the Linux kernel with 82 of 753 (11 percent) of its functions having 
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complexity amounts exceeding 10.  With 118 of 776 (15 percent) of its functions having 
complexity values greater than 10, the Talisker kernel falls in between the other two 




Data Avail Value > 10 Value > 15
Linux 769 753 82           
(11%)
37           
(5%)
OpenBSD   925 922 195          
(21%)
112          
(12%)
Talisker 776 776 118          
(15%)





Table 17.   Linux Kernel Complexity Distribution. 
c. Schedule Module Complexity 
As the schedule module summary shows in Table 18, this portion of the 
complexity analysis has Linux as the least complex followed by OpenBSD and then 




Data Avail Value > 10 Value > 15
Linux       
sched.c
17 14 1            
(7%)
0            
(0%)
OpenBSD    
kern-synch.c
17 17 3            
(18%)
1            
(6%)
Talisker    
schedule.c
143 143 33           
(23%)






Table 18.   Schedule Module Dependencies and Complexity Summary. 
The Linux schedule module with only one of its 17 functions having a 
complexity greater than 10 is the least complex, while OpenBSD with 3 of 17 functions 
has a complexity greater than 10.  In comparison, Talisker has 33 of 143 module 
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functions with values greater than 10, leading to the highest complexity of all the 
schedule modules analyzed.   
5. Number-of-Lines-of-Code 
The file summary reports from the operating system and kernel projects provide 
data about the source files regarding the number of functions and the total number-of- 
lines-of-code.  These measures were used to build the operating system and kernel 
summary reports that follow.  For the schedule module analysis, the summary table 
constructed used data extracted from the function information reports since specific 
module details are not included in the file summaries.  Using this data gathered in the 
previous section, an average number of lines per function were calculated for each case in 
the analysis.  These results will help determine which operating system, kernel, and 
schedule module bests matches the archaic thumb rule that a function should not exceed 
more than 60 lines of code.  Although McCabe metric is a better measure of complexity, 
this analysis is included to compare against the cyclomatic complexity results.  
a. Operating System Code  
The McCabe complexity analysis for the three operating systems placed 
Talisker as the least complex followed by Linux, with OpenBSD next.  In the complexity 
summary illustrated in Table 19, these results agree with the McCabe analysis.  With an 
average of 52 lines of code per function (56K lines of code divided by 1075 functions), 
Talisker is the least complex.  Linux follows with 61 lines per function (245K lines of 
code divided by 4015 functions).  And  OpenBSD is the most complex with 66 lines of 
code per function on average (245K lines of code divided by 3710 functions).     
Linux       
C Code
4015 245K 61
OpenBSD    
C Code
3710 245K 66








Table 19.   Operating System - Lines of Code Complexity Summary. 
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b. Kernel Code  
From the previous kernel analysis using McCabe’s complexity metric, 
Linux, Talisker and OpenBSD was the ranking found from least to most complex.  Using 
the average number of lines per function, the results again agree with the earlier analysis 
as shown in Table 20.  Linux, with 39K lines of code divided by 769 functions, has an 
average of 51 lines per function, making it the least complex kernel.  The Talisker kernel 
comes in second with 57 lines per function (44K lines of code divided by 776 functions).  
And the most complex, with an average of 61 lines of code per function (56K lines 
divided by 925 functions), is the OpenBSD kernel.     
Linux       
C Code
769 39K 51
OpenBSD    
C Code
925 56K 61
Talisker     
C/C++ Code
776 44K 57
Kernel Functions Lines Avg No. 
Lines/Func
 
Table 20.   Kernel - Lines of Code Complexity Summary. 
c. Schedule Module Code  
As the schedule module summary shows in Table 21, the “sched.c” 
module found in Linux is the least complex with 23 lines of code per function on average 
(394 lines divided by 17 functions).   
Linux       
sched.c
17 394 23
OpenBSD    
kern_synch.c
17 546 32








Table 21.   Schedule Module - Lines of Code Complexity Summary. 
OpenBSD’s “kern_synch.c” source file is the second in line with 32 lines 
per function (546 lines divided by 17 functions).  In comparison, the “schedule.c” module 
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found in Talisker has an average of 38 lines of code per function (5413 lines divided by 
143 functions), making it the most complex.  These results again match those found using 
the McCabe complexity metrics.   
G. COMPLEXITY IN OPERATING SYSTEMS 
Alan Shaw [SHA74] once stated that computer operating systems are among the 
most complex “systems” ever devised by humans, and it is only recently that we have 
been able to understand and coherently organize this complexity.  From the complexity 
analysis that was conducted using the McCabe approach, the values calculated by Imagix 
4D greatly surpassed the recommended threshold points previously presented.  Some of 
the reasons for these large values may be due to the complex nature of operating systems 
as commented by Shaw.  Memory addressing, process scheduling, interrupts and 
exceptions, system calls, I/O device management, virtual file system management, and 
program execution in a multithreaded environment, are only a few of the many 
capabilities required of modern operating systems today.  The values found in our 
comparative analysis may not necessarily be bad, but rather characteristic of complexity 
at another level.  Therefore, this higher complexity should not be a reason to deter 
improvements in the design and implementation of operating systems.   
H. CONCLUSION 
From our comparative analysis, several different aspects of the three operating 
systems and their respective kernels and schedule modules were studied, keeping the 
principles of hierarchical structuring, modular design, and information hiding serving as 
the basis of the analysis.  The McCabe Cyclomatic Complexity and the number-of-lines-
of-code metrics were also included in this basis.  As a result, Table 22 shows a summary 
of the design and complexity issues considered.  In this presentation, a number one 
signifies that a certain system, kernel, or module exhibited the best qualities of a certain 
design principle.  For the two complexity measures illustrated, a number one signifies the 
least complex.  As illustrated, OpenBSD is the best overall when considering hierarchical 
structuring, modularity, and information hiding.  The Linux kernel and scheduler, on the 
other hand, are least complex when considering the McCabe complexity and the number-
of-lines-of-code, whereas the Talisker scores best of the operating systems.    
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Linux      
OS     3 2 2 2 2
OpenBSD 
OS 1 1 1 3 3
Talisker 
OS 2 3 3 1 1
Linux 
Kernel     2 2 2 1 1
OpenBSD 
Kernel 1 1 1 3 3
Talisker 
Kernel 3 3 3 2 2
Linux 
Sched      X 2 3 1 1
OpenBSD 
Synch X 1 1 2 2
Talisker 

































A. OPERATING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS  
It is important to note that system security requirements exist as a management 
tool.  In essence, this tool assists in the identification and prioritization of project 
implementation decisions, which impact the evolution of a reasonably secure operating 
system.  The effectiveness of this tool may be limited by the importance placed upon 
security in relation to the operating system and the data, which is generated and residing 
on the system.   
When weighing performance requirements against system security requirements, 
a balance must be defined and preserved.  It is of little value to a user of a high 
performance operating system if resource availability is sporadic due to control or 
manipulation of the operating system by an unauthorized source.  It is also of little value 
to a system user if resource availability is significantly degraded due to over tasking in 
support of system security requirements.  Nevertheless, security requirements within 
operating systems should not be left for discovery at a later date or briefly discussed and 
planned during a project wrap-up.  They need to be thoroughly defined in parallel with 
other requirement analyses in order to reduce cost and produce a system that exhibits 
security behavior that is coherent with respect to its requirements and that possesses a 
proper balance between other functionality and security. 
B. SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT  
As stated by Anderson [AND96], we should never forget that the great majority 
of actual security failures in operating systems result from simple blunders in design, 
construction, and operation.             
From the secure operating system overview, we noted that the environment to be 
protected must be well understood, an assessment of the threats to security must be 
reviewed, and the operating system must then be designed to provide the desired 
protection.  For higher levels of security, the protection scheme may include a security 
kernel that is responsible for enforcing the security policy.  To encompass all of the parts 
of a trusted operating system on which we depend for the correct enforcement of a 
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security policy, the notion of a trusted computing base and its security perimeter can also 
be included in the design of a general-purpose or embedded operating system.   
The security policy and model, trusted system design elements, and the security 
kernel concept are some of the key concepts to consider when building a secure operating 
system.  Hierarchical structuring, modularity, and information hiding, which were 
presented in our study as secure software design principles, are also important elements 
of design and implementation.  To ensure all of these principles are incorporated into the 
development of a secure operating system and maintained throughout its lifecycle, 
evaluation methods such as the Common Criteria (CC) and the Trusted Computer System 
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) can be utilized to establish a level of assurance.  Thus, the 
operating system will be implemented in such a way that the user has confidence that it 
will enforce the security policy, and it will meet the expectations of the user with a 
certain degree of trust.   
Since operating systems are complex by their nature, the designers of a secure 
operating system need to spend time thinking about the structure before writing the code. 
When implementation begins, the complexity of the source code should be measured to 
limit the size and complexity of the operating system, making it possible to conduct 
meaningful testing or certification as determined by evaluation methods such as TCSEC.  
The McCabe Cyclomatic Complexity metric, which measures the amount of decision 
logic in a software module, is one way to correlate a source module’s complexity to its 
error frequency, thereby providing a strong indicator of its testability, as well as its 
understandability and receptiveness to modification.  Thus, reducing complexity and size 
must be the goal in every step of the design, including system specification, design, and 
detailed programming.  With these goals of constructing source code that is 
straightforward and understandable, an automated tool such as Imagix 4D can be a 
valuable aid to help each programmer of the project team have a thorough comprehension 
of the software, and help produce source code that is less complex, less error-prone, and 




C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS 
Hierarchical structuring, modularity, information hiding, McCabe complexity, 
and number-of-lines-of code composed the basis of the comparative analysis performed 
on the Linux, OpenBSD, and Talisker operating systems, kernels, and scheduling 
modules.   
In the hierarchical structuring analysis, the OpenBSD operating system had the 
best design with the fewest number of circular dependencies between each of its software 
layers.  Linux and Talisker, in this category, fell short with a few more upward 
dependencies.  In the kernel analysis, however, Linux demonstrated more loops in its 
design as compared to Talisker.  As Parnas [PAR96] stated, performance goals and 
hardware limitations often interfere with structure.  As the results from our study 
illustrate, operating systems like Talisker and Linux may place functionality and 
performance as the primary design goals, rather than giving proper attention to the system 
architecture.  If an operating system is designed with a layered hierarchy that exhibits 
partial ordering, then the upper layers can be removed without affecting the rest of the 
system and circular error states between the layers can be avoided.   
Regarding modularity, OpenBSD best demonstrated the properties expected of a 
good design.  In the operating system, kernel, and schedule module analysis, Linux 
followed behind OpenBSD.  In comparison, Talisker with the fewest number of source 
files in its design demonstrated questionable modularity.  Good modular programming 
helps guarantee that errors in one module will not affect another.  With this kind of 
control in the design, it is much easier to gain confidence in the reliability of a large 
system, since the modular separation helps prevent the spread of trouble created by 
malicious activity or flaws in the operating system.  
The ranking pattern of OpenBSD first, followed by Linux, and then Talisker was 
repeated in the information hiding analysis.  Talisker did have a smaller percentage of 
global variables in its schedule module as compared to the Linux implementation, but the 
commercial operating system did exhibit the largest percentage in the operating system 
and kernel portions of the analysis.  Regarding good modular programming, information 
hiding is an important element that ensures that the interface is well defined.  The only 
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way a module’s internal databases or variables should be manipulated is through a 
simple, high-level interface, thereby hiding the details of the implementation. 
In the analysis of complexity using both the McCabe and lines of code metrics, 
OpenBSD does not fare well in comparison to the other two operating systems.  Instead, 
Linux exhibits the least amount of complexity when reviewing the kernel and schedule 
module analysis results.  In the operating system portion, however, Talisker was the least 
complex.  The OpenBSD project team claims that no system installed with default 
settings has ever been remotely compromised in the past four years [GEO02].  But how 
can this be true if it is more complex in design?  The entire source code tree for 
OpenBSD is audited for the most frequent of security problems, including buffer 
overflows.  As commented by Vaughan-Nichols [VAU01], OpenBSD has had a team of 
auditors since 1996 working on finding potential problems and fixing them before they 
can develop in to security holes, making them more proactive rather than reactive to the 
computer security problem.  From their extensive design, implementation, and code audit 
efforts, the source code is clean, consistent, and correct, providing a level of confidence 
that surpasses Linux and other commercial operating systems.  This rigorous design 
process agrees with McCabe’s argument that complexity measures greater than 10 should 
be reserved for projects that have several operational advantages over typical projects, 
including experienced staff, formal design, a modern programming language, structured 
programming, code walkthroughs, and a comprehensive test plan.   
It is also worth mentioning that the first BSD operating system did not consider 
security as its first priority.  As the Multics case study demonstrated, any attempt to 
retrofit security is a difficult task.  Therefore, some of the complexity exhibited by 
OpenBSD may be remnants of the original BSD design.   
Since it places security as its first priority, OpenBSD’s design may be more 
complex due to the code it includes for security reasons.  With the “daily security audit” 
and other features, OpenBSD includes many more auditing cryptographic functions and 
that are built into the design and turned on by default.     
From Seifried’s [SEI01] online discussions, he gives reasons why Linux will 
never be as secure as OpenBSD.  He claims that in the Linux world no form of extensive 
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code auditing exists and likely never will.  This is due to the vendors of the distributions 
having a small security team of less than a dozen people trying to review several hundred 
megabytes of source code.  Hence, it is common for the original software to be insecure 
causing vendors to rely on the maintenance of their own patch sets rather than being 
proactive to security problems.     
Security requirements may cause the software to exhibit more complexity and be 
somewhat less efficient in performance.  Thus, the customer of an operating system needs 
to weigh the security risks against the performance costs, and try to find a medium that 
provides the proper amount of protection in the particular, security threat environment.  
Regardless of the complexity, the system development process should be to design the 
architecture before implementing it, document the design, review and analyze the 
documented design, and review the implementation for consistency with the design.  
Using these basic rules, the trusted system design elements, and the secure software 
design principles, a more secure operating system may be achieved. 
D. FUTURE WORK 
Future work may include normalizing and weighting of the data gathered in this 
analysis to provide meaningful overall metrics for operating system complexity, as well 
as finding a more appropriate set of McCabe threshold values that apply to operating 
system design.  An inter-function complexity measure may also be useful to determine 
the gratuitous use of macros and sub-functions.  Additionally, a more granular approach 
to the cyclomatic complexity would be useful to distinguish inherent functional 
complexity from pathological coding complexity.  These improvements to the McCabe 
metric could help provide a more detailed result consistent with the expectations of 
operating system complexity.   
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